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Guest Workers and Integration:
Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and
Americans Owe One Another
CristinaM Rodriguezt

The presence of over eleven million unauthorized immigrants in the United States' has generated a wide-ranging and
charged debate in recent years over the need to overhaul our
immigration laws. Among the suggested reforms, the most novel
(for the United States) and controversial has been the proposal
that we adopt a large-scale temporary worker program to address current labor needs and channel future flows of unskilled
migrants, who come primarily from Mexico and Latin America.
Since his first term, President Bush has been calling for some
form of guest worker program, 2 and many of the bills that have
emerged from both houses of Congress in the last few years have
t Associate Professor of Law, NYU School of Law. For their generous and challenging insights on drafts of this piece, I would like to thank David Abraham, Adam Cox,
Norman Dorsen, Cindy Estlund, Jennifer Gordon, Deep Gulasekaram, Dan Hulsebosch,
Lewis Kornhauser, Stephen Legomsky, Hiroshi Motomura, Liam Murphy, Bill Nelson,
Burt Neuborne, Sam Scheffler, Peter Schuck, and Kenji Yoshino. Thank you also to participants in the NYU Faculty Workshop, the Washington University School of Law Faculty Workshop, the Liberalism, Strangers, and Members Workshop at the 2007 AALS
annual meeting, the University of Chicago Legal Forum Immigration Law Symposium,
and the NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy Immigration Reform Symposium. I
benefited as well from early conversations with Noah Feldman, Serena Hoy, David Martin, and Eric Posner, and I am extremely grateful for the outstanding research assistance
of Xinying Chi and Lisa Ross.
1 See Jeffrey S. Passel, The Size and Characteristicsof the Unauthorized Migrant
Population in the United States 1 (Pew Hispanic Center, Mar 7, 2006), available at
<http://www.pewhispanic.org> (last visited Jan 20, 2007).
2 See, for example, Gustavo Mohar, Mexico-United States Migration:A Long Way to
Go (Migration Policy
Institute Mar 1, 2004),
available
at <http://www.
migrationinformation.org> (last visited May 7, 2007) (discussing joint statement issued
by President Bush and Vicente Fox in 2001 expressing commitment to developing a temporary worker program as part of their commitment to "forging a new and realistic approach to migration to ensure it is safe, orderly, legal and dignified); Jim Rutenberg,
David S. Cloud and Carl Hulse, The Immigration Debate: The Overview; President Calls
for Compromise on Immigration NY Times Al (May 16, 2006) (quoting a speech the
President gave the previous day: '"Isupport a temporary worker program that would
create a legal path for foreign workers to enter our country in an orderly way, for a limited period of time.").
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included a temporary worker program as a key component of
comprehensive immigration reform. 3 A guest worker program
has become the measure favored by those who eschew enforcement-only strategies in favor of reform that accommodates the
market realities that have generated the unauthorized population. Advocates of a guest worker program acknowledge that the
legal admissions system, as currently designed, cannot manage
the patterns of migration generated by these market forces. A
temporary worker program would address current institutional
limitations by creating new legal mechanisms for channeling the
migration likely to persist in the future, no matter how long or
high a border wall Congress resolves to build. A guest worker
program thus represents a critical forward-looking complement
to legalization programs that would permit millions of unauthorized migrants already in the United States to become lawful
residents, ultimately obviating the need for large-scale legalization programs in the future.
This need, to devise a solution to the problem of unauthorized migration that recognizes the limitations of enforcementonly strategies in an integrated hemisphere, is urgent. Unsurprisingly, powerful interest groups and public officials in both
the United States and Mexico support a temporary worker program. 4 Such a program seemingly would suit the labor market
needs of the U.S., satisfying domestic employers and consumers,
and the development needs of Mexico, which depends heavily on
remittances from abroad. 5 In addition, the regularization of
cross-border traffic appeals to our humanitarian impulses by
providing a legal avenue of migration for those who otherwise
3 See, for example, Eliot Turner and Marc R. Rosenblum, Solving the Unauthorized
Migration Problem: Proposed Legislation in the U.S., (Migration Policy Institute Sept 1,
2005), available at <http://www.migrationinformation.org> (last visited May 7, 2007)
(discussing legislation introduced during the 109th Congress in 2006 that would have
adopted a guest worker program); STRIVE Act, HR 15 110th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 22,
2007), available at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?cllO:H.R.1645:> (last visited
May 7, 2007).
4 See, for example, Michael S. Teitelbaum and Philip Martin, No such thing as 'temporary workers,' Christian Sci Monitor 9 (Dec. 12, 2005) (explaining that a guest worker
program is being pushed because "some employer and ethnic lobbies expect to benefit"
and that "small, concentrated, and well-financed interest groups ... expect to profit significantly in the short term"); Francisco Alba, Mexico: A Crucial Crossroads,(Migration
Policy Institute Mar 2004), available at <http://www.migrationinformation.org> (last
visited May 7, 2007) (describing history of Mexico's efforts to negotiate a temporary
worker program with the United States).
5 See Multilateral Investment Fund, Sending Money Home: Leveraging the Development Impact of Remittances 1 (Inter-American Development Bank 2006), available at
<http://www.iadb.orglIDBDocs.cfm?docnum=823579> (last visited May 9, 2007).
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are willing to risk their lives by crossing the Arizona or Texas
deserts illegally. Similarly, regularization promises to protect
immigrants from exploitation by smugglers and employers, as
well as from the general anxiety typical of undocumented migrants' lives. Temporary worker programs also appeal to current
and potential migrants by providing them with legal means to
support their families in the short-term or raise money to finance
home construction or business ventures in their countries of origin. Add to these promises the allure of cosmopolitanism, or the
desire to have our immigration policy reflect the fact that we live
in an increasingly globalized world in which people travel back
and forth across borders carrying more than one set of political
and social allegiances, and it is easy to see why diverse parties
on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border support a policy that facilitates temporary or cyclical migration.
Despite the idea's appeal, however, I argue in this Article
that we should resist the temptation to adopt a large-scale guest
worker program, because such a program is likely to fail on two
interrelated counts: It will fail to achieve the short-term objectives supporters claim for it, and it will thwart what should be
the long-term goal of our immigration policy-the goal of integration. On the first count, the implicit promise of the guest worker
program is that it will satisfy the United States' labor needs
while reducing illegal immigration, thus restoring the rule of law
to the system and enabling the government to better track immigrants to the U.S.6 As studies of guest worker programs consistently reveal, however, though a guest worker program may address labor market demands, it will do so at the risk of compounding the illegal immigration problem and perpetuating the
poor treatment of migrant workers.
But second, and more important, though a guest worker program may satisfy many short-term interests, in the long term it
will compromise our ability to integrate immigrants effectively
into the American body politic, in large part precisely because it
will fail to prevent the emergence of a new undocumented population. This insight has not been clearly articulated in the debate
over the guest worker idea, but it should be central to the discussion. Important participants in the current immigration debate
6 See, for example, Rutenberg, Cloud, and Hulse, The Immigration Debate, NY
Times (cited in note 2) (reviewing President Bush's speech defending guest worker programs as a means of reducing human smuggling, replacing illegal workers with lawful
taxpayers, and making certain we know who is in our country and why).
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have emphasized that the United States can no longer do without a meaningful integration policy to complement our immigration control measures. 7 But whether the U.S. should adopt a
separate integration policy or not, it is critical that the system of
immigrant admissions and controls itself reflects integrationist
aspirations. Proposed reforms should be judged in part by
whether they will facilitate the incorporation of immigrants and
their descendants into American social and civic life. In this Article, I make the case that a guest worker program fails this test.
Both of these conclusions depend on the assumption that
many of the migrants who are now here illegally, as well as their
counterparts in the future, have or will form the intent to remain
in the United States for prolonged periods of time, if not permanently, for reasons that implicate Americans' own needs and
preferences as much as the migrants' aspirations.8 Because of
this intent to remain, guest worker programs designed to admit
workers for limited periods of time are likely to prevent the
emergence of an undocumented population only temporarily. And
because of migrants' intent to remain, it is essential that our
admissions policies reflect our long-term interest in ensuring the
assimilation 9 of immigrants and their children into American
society.
Temporary worker programs ultimately thwart this incorporation objective, because they erect undesirable and otherwise
avoidable obstacles to the integration process by constraining the
two key mechanisms of immigrant integration: mobility and reciprocity. Incorporation depends on immigrants having mobility-the ability to move freely among society's various sectors as
well as in and out of ethnic communities. Receiving societies logically and rightly expect immigrants to adapt to their new surroundings, but immigrants cannot make good on that obligation
without mobility. This mobility depends on immigrants' ability to
7 See Spencer Abraham, et al, Immigration and America's Future: A New Chapter
xix-xx (Migration Policy Institute 2006), Executive Summary available at
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/task force/new-chapter summary.pdf> (last visited Jan
20, 2007).
8 See, for example, Marta Tienda, Be Our Guest?, Am Prospect 19 (Nov 2005) ("Unskilled immigration is likely to continue-through legal or clandestine means--owing to
brisk growth in industries requiring limited skills, the exodus of native workers from
declining industries, and the powerful role of social networks in recruiting fellow compatriots eager for a share of the American wage pie.").
9 The term "assimilation" carries a lot of freight. I use it interchangeably with the
terms "integration" and "incorporation" and define what I mean by these concepts in Part
I A.
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emerge from immigrant sectors of the economy and to develop
the social and cultural capital necessary for interacting with
people and institutions at large-both of which depend on the
security of what I call the right to remain, or the security of a
continued presence in the U.S. that guest worker programs do
not provide.
Incorporation also depends on extant members of the receiving society displaying a reciprocal willingness to adapt to the
presence of immigrant communities. 10 A society's failure to adapt
blocks immigrant assimilation by preventing immigrants from
becoming part of important social institutions and community
relations. The failure to treat immigrants as potential members
also reflects an absence of the spirit of social cooperation that
should characterize a democratic society. Implicit in this concept
of reciprocity is another important assumption I defend throughout this Article. The role the United States and her citizens have
played in generating the forces that produce migration, through
our trade, immigration, and foreign policies, as well as our economic preferences, coupled with our resulting dependence on
immigrants from Mexico and Latin America in particular, gives
rise to the need for and obligation to adapt to immigrant presence.
Guest worker programs ultimately fail to encourage either
mobility or reciprocity. They impose bureaucratic requirements
that constrain immigrant mobility in the economy and therefore
in society at large. Indeed, guest worker programs historically
have compounded immigrant isolation and resulted in serious
exploitation, both in the U.S. and in other societies." These restraints are exacerbated by the uncertainty guest workers experience regarding their long-term prospects in the United
States. What is more, by treating the immigrant as a temporary
fix for the domestic economy's current labor needs, guest worker
10 In its 1997 recommendations, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform emphasized the reciprocal obligations immigration creates. "Immigrants must accept the
obligations we impose-to obey our laws, to pay taxes, to respect other cultures and ethnic groups. At the same time, citizens incur obligations to provide an environment in
which newcomers can become fully participating members of our society." United States
Commission on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy 7 (1997).
11 Martin Ruhs, Temporary foreign worker programmes: Policies, adverse consequences, and the need to make them work, 6 Perspectives on Labour Migration 10-15
(2003), available at <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/pom/
pom6e.pdf$ (last visited Jan 20, 2007) (analyzing the consequences of major temporary
foreign worker programs adopted by several societies in the recent past, including creation of immigrant sectors in the economy and conditions of exploitation).
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programs encourage the receiving society to treat immigrants as
mere means to an end rather than as potentially permanent
members of its communities. By labeling the immigrant a temporary guest, such programs contribute to a climate of inflexibility
and intolerance vis-A-vis the cultural pluralism immigrants inevitably generate-a belief that immigrants should be temporary
and should not change the "character" of our communities. Temporary worker programs thus give the receiving society no incentive to adapt to demographic changes or to incorporate immigrants into mainstream institutions. The United States' relative
success at assimilating large groups of immigrants over time has
depended on our willingness to treat immigrants as potentially
permanent members of our society, but current guest worker
proposals attempt to address a large demographic phenomenon
12
without calling upon that willingness.
Of course, various guest worker models exist, and some
models are more likely to compromise the incorporation objective
than others. We can think of immigrant admissions policies as
existing on an integration continuum, with the status quo of high
levels of illegal immigration on one end and the admission of
immigrant workers for permanent residence on the other. Closest to the illegal immigration model, under which workers' complete lack of legal status dramatically compromises their ability
to integrate, is the sort of program advocated by the White House
in the 2007 incarnation of its immigration proposals. The program would have allocated temporary visas to workers for a
maximum of six years, required guest workers to leave the country every two years for six months at a time, and prohibited
workers from bringing spouses and children with them. 13 This
model closely resembles the guest worker programs of the infamous Bracero era in the U.S.14 and the models adopted by various developed nations around the world. The histories of these

12 A guest worker program could include a path to permanent residency and citizenship, of course; the McCain-Kennedy bill proposed in the spring of 2006, for example,
would have permitted guest workers to apply for adjustment of status at the end of their
visa cycles. See Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S 1033/H R 2330 (109th
Congress). I discuss this option in Part II A.
13 See Talking Nonsense: Bush Administration's Plan on Immigration Is Divorced
from Reality, Wash Post A14 (Apr 2, 2007).
14 See Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern
America 127-66 (Princeton 2004) (detailing the history of the Bracero program of the
1940s, 50s, and 60s). I discuss the Bracero experience in Parts II A and B.
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programs suggest that they create as many problems as they
15
solve.
But an alternative model that more closely approximates
admission for permanent membership does exist, in the form of a
provisional worker program that gives visa holders the opportunity to adjust to lawful permanent status, putting workers on a
path to citizenship as long as they meet certain criteria. This option has been advocated by Senators Edward Kennedy and John
McCain and is less likely to impose integration costs than the
sort of program currently advocated by the White House. What is
more, within this model, institutional design can make the program more or less conducive to integration: adjustment to permanent status can be made easy or difficult, and features such as
portability of visas from employer to employer and the ability to
sponsor spouses and children will help determine the success of a
guest worker program. In other words, in considering whether to
adopt a guest worker program, the choice is not of the all-ornothing variety; some guest worker programs will be more likely
than others to thwart integrationist objectives.
That said, even if superior institutional design or other ameliorative adjustments might address some of the failures common
to guest worker policies adopted in other times and places, those
experiences provide us with powerful cautionary tales that
should not go underappreciated. What is more, even a guest
worker program that successfully reduces undocumented immigration might not meet the criteria of fairness. The United
States' adoption of a large-scale guest worker program in response to the current crisis of undocumented immigration would
signal an important and risky shift in our conceptualization of
immigration-from an immigration policy designed to create
permanent members to a policy dependent on temporary and ad
hoc solutions to inescapable problems. 16 This paradigm shift may
be satisfying in the short-term to immigrants and employers, but
it represents a troubling turn for a democratic society based on
principles of social cooperation. The idea of a guest worker program is not consistent with the political obligations we owe to
those who, in Michael Walzer's terms, do "socially necessary
15 For a discussion of this point, see Part II.
16 Though our immigration system currently supports a number of small-scale temporary worker programs, presenting a large-scale guest worker program as a solution to
the unauthorized migration crisis would signal a departure from an important commitment to constructing our immigration policy to create permanent forms of membership.
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work," 17 and with whom we voluntarily associate because of our
economic preferences. Though my primary aim in this Article is
to demonstrate how guest worker programs threaten immigrant
integration and are therefore questionable policy, I also take the
guest worker debate as an opportunity to open up a new and crucial line of inquiry into the political obligations we owe both current and future migrants.
To establish why we should resist the shift toward the type
of temporary solutions embodied by the guest worker program, I
explore the practical and theoretical dimensions of this question
in turn. In Part I, I define integration and assimilation by considering what the process of incorporating immigrants into
American life entails for both the immigrant and the receiving
society. I identify the types of mobility crucial for immigrants, as
well as the forms of reciprocity that facilitate successful incorporation. In so doing, I consider the extent to which reciprocity is
required as both a practical matter and as a matter of obligation.
In Part II, I consider the ways in which a temporary worker program would frustrate immigrant mobility and social reciprocity
and argue that we should respond to the apparent breakdown of
the immigrant admissions system by substantially increasing the
number of permanent visas available to semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Of course, political support and administrative
capacity might not exist for such a reform, and the status quo of
high levels of unauthorized migration is untenable: undocumented immigrants are not mobile, and their presence erodes
support for immigration, making reciprocity difficult to achieve. I
therefore give brief consideration to how a temporary worker policy should be designed, as a second best solution, with features
that will prevent our immigration policy from losing sight of the
long-term objectives of immigrant assimilation.
In assessing guest worker programs for their compatibility
with the integrationist objective, I am not suggesting that our
admissions policies should not also serve other important goals,
nor do I mean to imply that each of the components of mobility
and reciprocity I identify must be a part of any admissions policy.
We certainly should strive through the immigration laws to harness the benefits of immigration to our economy and our social
life, and matters of political viability and cost will limit the extent to which the components of integration can be realized fully.
17 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralismand Equality 60 (Basic
Books 1983).
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At the same time, however, our admissions policies should reflect
who is seeking entry and why-the only way truly to address the
problem of unauthorized migration. Lawmakers should approach
the issue in a decidedly pragmatic way and ask: Taking certain
amounts and types of immigration as a given (low-skilled and
family-oriented immigration predominantly from Latin America),
how do we devise an immigration system that ensures effective
absorption of immigrants in the long-term?
Though this approach can be used to frame debates about
nearly every aspect of our immigration system, I focus in this
Article on the compatibility of one major policy proposal with the
incorporationist objective. Because guest worker programs are
designed to address one particular type of immigration, my observations regarding integration are made with this particular
group, which is defined by the three interrelated features of
class, culture, and geography, in mind. The migrants who are
undocumented today and who would become guest workers consist of low-skilled workers and their families who are responding
to the imperatives of a semi-integrated hemispheric market.
Though migrants from all over the world continue to come to the
United States, immigration since 1965 has been overwhelmingly
Latin American and Asian,1 8 and the unauthorized migration
that proposed guest worker programs would address is predominantly from Mexico and other parts of Latin America. 19 Thus, not
only is this migration enabled by the labor market, but geography also contributes to its persistence. Because the United States
has an extended and largely flat land border with Mexico, migrants are able to cross into the United States with regularity,
the Border Patrol notwithstanding. At its core, then, the current
debate over guest workers is of a piece not only with discussions
18 See Marcelo M. Sudrez-Orozco, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About As-

similation But Were Afraid To Ask, in Marcelo M. Sudrez-Orozco, Carola Su~rez-Orozco,
and Desir6e Baolian Qin, eds, The New Immigration: An Interdisciplinary Reader 67
(Routledge 2005) (explaining that today more than 50 percent of all immigrants are from
Latin America and 27 percent are from Asia). At this stage, an obvious but extremely
underappreciated point should be made. Latin American immigration is not strictly a
post-1965 phenomenon, and the Latino presence in the United States is not exclusively
the result of immigration. Rather, the current wave of immigration is adding to and
changing a long-entrenched and politically powerful population marked by a complex but
identifiable "ethnic" (for lack of a better word) character. This dynamic underscores that
the issue of how to incorporate a Latino population into American life is not a strictly
transitional matter, in the sense that immigration from Eastern Europe, Germany, or
Italy has been.
19 Passel, Size and Characteristicsof the Unauthorized Migrant Population at i-ii
(cited in note 1) (noting that 56 percent of the unauthorized population of 11.5-12 million
comes from Mexico, and another 22 percent comes from the rest of Latin America).
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of the rights of workers, but also with consideration of the dramatic growth of the Latino population and what that means for
the future of American society. Much of my discussion will be
applicable to other types of migration and to other societies, but
the characteristics of current unauthorized migration to the U.S.
render skepticism regarding guest workers particularly warranted.
In the end, the inquiry into the relationship between guest
worker programs and immigrant integration requires the reconciliation of two apparently contradictory ideas. On the one hand,
we must acknowledge that we are not in complete control of our
borders; labor markets and transnational social networks are
beyond the capacity (and will) of the U.S. government to regulate
fully. As the result of these forces, migrants develop transnational identities, forging lives and affiliations without complete
respect for borders. On the other hand, national citizenship remains a vital institution-an essential framework for grounding
belonging and organizing political and social cooperation. Our
vision of who qualifies as a citizen must take into account the
social and market forces that produce migration, both legal and
illegal. And the policies we implement to manage that migration
at the entry stage must not lose sight of the need to produce an
integrated body politic that mirrors the complexities of migration.
I. MOBILITY, RECIPROCITY, AND
SOCIAL CHANGE THROUGH INTEGRATION

Before considering what immigrant incorporation entails, it
is important to establish why incorporation should be our goal.
After all, guest worker programs are arguably designed with the
explicit intention of preventing immigrants from integrating into
the body politic. But certain realities require that we adopt an
integrationist framework. First, some demographers suggest that
a substantial amount of immigration by unskilled or low-skilled
individuals and their families, particularly from Latin America,
will persist into the future. 20 As sociologists Alejandro Portes and
Rub6n Rumbaut have emphasized, social interconnectedness
20 See Mary C. Waters and Tomds R. Jim6nez, Assessing Immigrant Assimilation:
New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges, 31 Ann Rev Sociol 105, 107 (2005) ('The
social, political, and economic forces that spur and perpetuate migration appear to be well
entrenched, and we believe that there will be a resulting replenishment of immigrants
that is likely to be a defining characteristic of American immigration for years to come.").
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survives economic imperatives. "Once migrant networks have
consolidated, they can become sufficiently powerful to sustain
the movement in the absence of the original economic incentives. ' 21 Of course, some new research suggests that the push
factors emanating from Mexico may dissipate in the next decade. 22 But whether that proves to be the case, our need for labor
is likely to persist. As Dowell Myers explains in his new study of
the relationship between immigration and the aging baby boomers, immigrant workers across the skilled to unskilled spectrum
are essential to our economy's future. 23 In other words, continued
24
immigration is both inevitable and necessary.
Given these realities, a focus on integration is required to
promote social peace. It is in our interest to acknowledge that
21 See Alejandro Portes and Rub6n G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait18
(California 3d ed 2006). See also Douglas S. Massey, Luin Goldring, and Jorge Durand,
Continuities in Transnational Labor Migration: An Analysis of Nineteen Mexican Communities, 99 Am J Sociol 1492, 1500 ("Migration also changes the cultural context within
which decisions are made, and international movement becomes increasingly attractive
for reasons that are not purely economic.").
22 See, for example, Shannon O'Neil, Will we have enough workers? Palm Beach Post
12A (Apr 9, 2007) (citing study by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development indicating that over the next ten years roughly five million fewer workers will enter
the United States, suggesting that "demography may accomplish what border enforcement has not").
23 See Dowell Myers, Immigrants and Boomers: Forging a New Social Contract for
the Future of America 37-38 (Russell Sage 2007).
24 By emphasizing this reality, I do not mean to suggest it would be illegitimate for
immigration policy makers or theorists to consider creating incentives for certain types of
immigrants, namely high-skilled immigrants, to come to the United States, or that it
would be illegitimate or ill-advised to set caps on the numbers of immigrants permitted to
enter each year. Of course, our efforts to attract highly-skilled immigrants raises another
vexing moral issue concerning the extent to which such policies compromise the ability of
developing countries to continue their development. Whether "brain drain" always impedes development is debated, and the relationship between migration and development
is complex. But efforts by receiving countries to attract high-skilled workers from developing countries must be understood as raising substantial moral concerns. In addition, it
may be that temporary worker programs that provide incentives for migrants to return to
their home countries are optimal from a development perspective-an outcome that
should inform our own policy and sense of obligation. The connections between migration,
development, temporary worker programs, and remittances are just now coming to be
understood. For a discussion of the links between temporary migration programs and
development, consider Dovelyn Agunias, Linking Temporary Worker Schemes with Development, (Migration Policy Institute Feb 1, 2007), available at <http://www.
migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=581> (last visited Apr 3, 2007); Peggy
Levitt and Ninna Nyberg-Sorensen, Global Migration Perspectives: The transnational
turn in migration studies (Global Commission on International Migration 2004), available
at <http://www.gcim.org/gmp/Global%20Migration%20Perspectives%20No%206.pdf> (last
visited Apr 3, 2007); Raul Delgado-Wise and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, Migration and
Development: Lessons from the Mexican Experience (Migration Policy Institute 2007),
(last
available at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=581>
visited Apr 3, 2007).
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migrants are here to stay and to facilitate their becoming functional and well-adjusted members of our society. As Myers contends in calling for a new social contract between immigrants
and Americans, investing in the integration of immigrants today
will create the workers and taxpayers we will depend on in the
future.2 5 And as Hiroshi Motomura has emphasized, the European societies that recruited foreign workers in the 1960s and
'70s without making a corresponding commitment to integrating
them into their societies now face serious social cleavages as a
26
result.
A focus on integration is also proper as a political matter. As
I develop in detail in Part II of this Article, the people to whom
guest worker visas would be made available are people to whom
we have associative obligations. Their migration is inspired not
simply by the lack of employment or development in their home
countries, but also by choices Americans have made at the level
of trade policy, as well as by the more quotidian desire for the
less expensive consumer goods that immigrant labor facilitates.
These economic choices give rise to social relationships whereby
immigrant workers become connected to lawful residents and
U.S. citizens. By virtue of our participation in the creation of
these forms of association, we have a political duty to take account of and cooperate with these social networks, which means
incorporating immigrants into our society as more than laborers.
Hemispheric economic integration is giving rise to a need for political union of some kind structured around shared governance
and reciprocal rights and duties. One way to make these broader
forms of cooperation possible is to integrate into our political and
social institutions those individuals who have relocated to the
U.S. and thus participate in the person-to-person contact that
fuels the need for forms of political engagement across borders
and without respect to legal citizenship status.
Finally, striving to integrate new populations into existing
political and social structures is itself worthwhile. It is important
to avoid overinvestment in the cultural or demographic status
25 See Myers, Immigrants and Boomers at 258 (cited in note 23) ("A[n important] step
in building the hopeful future is to accelerate the rate of integration of immigrants into
the mainstream of U.S. society and the U.S. economy. We need to assist their economic
advancement and their full participation in our society, including early incorporation into
our democratic political process .... [Another] necessary step is for citizen-voters and
taxpayers to embrace the homegrown strategy and increase their investment in the education of the next generation.").
26 See Hiroshi Motomura, ChoosingImmigrants, Making Citizens, 59 Stan L Rev 857,
869-70 (2007).
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quo, or in insulating ourselves from the change that integration
inevitably brings.2 7 As I have explained in previous work, cultural evolution is not only unavoidable, it represents an inherent
good-not just for the assimilating immigrant, but for the receiving society, which depends on the regular infusion of striving
immigrants for its continuing vitality. 28 As I make clear below, I
am agnostic with respect to what American society ultimately
should look like as an aesthetic and cultural matter. The point is
that we should not resist the political imperatives that require
integration in an effort to stop the change that immigrant incorporation produces, in part because that change produces value.
A.

Incorporation as Process

Before we can establish how guest worker programs
threaten immigrant incorporation, we must explore in more detail what incorporation entails. The process by which immigrants
become Americans has been described using various terms. The
term "assimilation" has an inescapably political dimension, and
attempts to define and critique the concept fill volumes. 29 At the
level of public discourse and ideology, "assimilation" is synonymous with a melting pot narrative according to which immigrants shed the customs of their homelands as they become true
Americans. For some, assimilation is inexorable and romantic.
For others, the melting pot narrative oversimplifies a process
that is complex and involves change that is not necessarily linear
for either the immigrant or society. For still others, the association of "assimilation" with the melting pot view of American
identity renders it a loaded word, redolent of a historical tradition of coercion, xenophobia, and disrespect for the cultural differences embodied by immigrants and minority communities in
the United States.

27 Compare K. Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers
101, 113 (W W Norton & Co 2006) (discussing the value of cultural contamination, in the
context of the debate over the effects of mass culture on local traditions, and noting that
"[wie do not need, have never needed, settled community, a homogeneous system of values, in order to have a home. Cultural purity is an oxymoron.").
28 1 have discussed my view of the instrumental and democracy-promoting value of
cultural challenge and change elsewhere. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participation, 94 Cal L Rev 687, 726-28 (2006).
29 See, for example, Richard Alba and Victor Nee, Remaking the American Main.
stream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration 17-66 (Harvard 2003) (describing
and critiquing various assimilation theories). Consider Sudrez-Orozco, Sudrez-Orozco,
and Qin, eds, The New Immigration (cited in note 18).
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But assimilation is also descriptive. I invoke it in this Article
alongside the terms integration and incorporation to describe a
process of inevitable change-a conception of assimilation highlighted in a recent report of the Pew Hispanic Center, which
noted that the term "is now broadly accepted as a way to describe
the ways that immigrants and their offspring change as they
come in contact with their host society. ' 30 When used in this way,
assimilation "does not imply any superiority in the host society's
views or a particular value to the changes in attitudes and behavior among immigrants across generation [sic]." 3 1
Current sociological use of the term takes this focus on
change one step further by emphasizing its bidirectional nature.
Sociologists define "assimilation" as a two-way phenomenon, as.
opposed to a linear and complete absorption of the immigrant
into a static and extant culture, and use assimilation to describe
"the process by which the characteristics of members of immigrant groups and host societies come to resemble one another."32
In other words, assimilation is a phenomenon that changes immigrants and the host society alike.
Of course, from a policymaker's perspective, simply describing the process of change might be beside the point. He or she
might want to identify an acceptable endpoint to the assimilation
process to know when it has occurred and to direct the process
toward the socially desired objective. Classical assimilation theory identifies such an endpoint. It describes immigrants as "following a 'straight-line' convergence," according to which they increasingly resemble the host society as time passes, beginning
with "close social relations" with members of the host society,
"followed by large-scale intermarriage," and ending in "ethnic
identification" with the mainstream. 33 This definition presupposes the existence of an identifiable mainstream, and it suggests that it is possible to measure the success or failure of assimilation by comparing the current state of members of an im-

30 See Pew Hispanic Center, Assimilation and Language: Survey Brief 1 (Pew Hispanic Center March 2004), available at <http://www.pewhispanic.org> (last visited Jan
20, 2007).
31 Id.

32 Susan K. Brown and Frank D. Bean, Assimilation Models, Old and New: Explaining a Long-Term Process 1 (Migration Policy Institute Oct 1, 2006), available at
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=442> (last visited Jan 20,
2007).
33 Id.
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migrant group to the Americanized end state they are supposed
to achieve through assimilation.
But, of course, the "mainstream" is elusive. Even contemporary "melting pot" theorists 34 emphasize that the assimilation
process changes the host society, making it difficult to identify
assimilation's endpoint. Immigration ensures that a society's
mainstream evolves, taking on characteristics that originally
would have been ascribed to the immigrant.3 5 As a result, defining the assimilated endpoint of a given immigration wave is
largely a retrospective project for historians, not an aspirational
project for policymakers. The latter lack adequate tools to shape
culture to fit predetermined conceptions of outcome. Attempts by
policymakers to identify the mainstream into which immigrants
should be assimilating are likely to be beset by nostalgia, artificiality, or coercive attempts to recapture a world that no longer
36
exists.
In devising policies that promote assimilation, then, the real
concern for policymakers should not be whether immigration policy is sustaining the status quo 37 or producing a preferred cul34 For an example of contemporary melting pot theory and an attempt to revive and
redefine the concept of assimilation, consider Alba and Nee, Remaking the American
Mainstream(cited in note 29).
35 See, for example, Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 99 Am J Sociol at 1502 (cited in
note 21). The authors explain:
As migrants become part of established communities in the host country, they
adapt themselves to the local setting. Whether or not they have legal documents, they send their children to school, learn a minimum of the host country's
language, and use financial institutions and social services. Over time the local
landscape of the receiving community is transformed.... the migrants contribute to the creation and growth of a market for specialized foods, entertainment,
and cultural products. The formation of ethnic neighborhoods represents a
process of socioeconomic adaptation and transformation that permits many
"foreign" practices to be maintained in the new setting.
Id (citations omitted).
36 In a country as large and historically diverse as the United States, it is inevitable
that incorporation will occur on different terms in different regions depending on the
characteristics and history of the resident population, despite decisions made by the federal government with respect to immigrant admissions.
37 It is worth noting that when Congress adopted national origin quotas for immigration during the 1920s, it was trying to accomplish precisely this objective: to ensure that
subsequent immigration would mirror the population as it then stood. See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, David A. Martin, and Hiroshi Motomura, eds, Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 158-59 (West 2003), citing Select Commission on Immigration
and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest, Staff Report
(1981). In formulating the quotas, Congress relied on the 1890 Census, rather than the
Census of 1910, because the former reflected a population with more "desirable" cultural
characteristics. Id. This reliance resulted in a reduction of the Italian, Polish, and Greek
quotas and increased quotas for Northern European countries. Id. Congress sought to use
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tural outcome. Instead, the focus should be on whether a given
policy will help the bidirectional process of assimilation unfold
successfully-whether it will help integrate immigrants into political and social institutions and enhance their chances for success. Successful assimilation, in turn, should be defined by immigrants becoming full participants in the country's economic, social, and cultural life-by their becoming not only contributors,
but also equals. Success further depends on whether immigration is absorbed with minimal social cleavages and inter-group
competition. To achieve this success, policymakers should attempt: (1) to reduce obstacles to the immigrant's successful navigation of each of the different measures of assimilation; and (2)
to normalize the presence of immigrants and their descendants
in society at large with minimal social and political conflict over
the adaptations that the existing society must undergo to make
this possible.
In the end, there are two plausible answers to the question:
what sort of society do we want to have at the end of the process?
First, the answer is political, not cultural. We should insist on an
outcome where the people who live here are equal participants,
but it would be futile to insist on cultural particularities. Second,
we cannot know what sort of society large-scale immigration will
produce, and we should temper the inevitable impulse toward
defining our ideal immigration endpoint with this realization.
The best we can do is to enforce consistently the premise that a
mutuality of obligation exists as we negotiate this process. Immigrants and citizens alike bear the burden of ensuring that
immigrants become members. It is precisely because guest
worker programs make these obligations difficult to fulfill that
we should be wary of adopting such programs.
B.

Immigrant Adaptation and Mobility

Immigrant adaptation can be measured by considering the
trajectories of different cohorts. We might measure assimilation,
on the one hand, by how the immigrant generation is adjusting.
My core subjects-the current undocumented immigrant and the
possible future guest worker-represent this cohort. On the other
hand, a complete measure of assimilation requires understanding how the children of immigrants, who may have been born in
the immigrant admissions system to shape the cultural character of American society,
thus feeding a Nativist ideology that denigrated certain groups of immigrants in service
of a nostalgic view of American society. Id.
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the U.S. or who may have immigrated at a young age and therefore may not identify with the immigrant experience, are faring.
Sociologists and demographers who measure assimilation are
now profitably conducting longitudinal studies of the second generation,3 8 as well as of immigrants who arrived in the United
States as children. Not only do such measures give us a better
sense of how immigration affects American society in the long
term, they also make for more complete assessments of the absorption process.
This multi-generational perspective is particularly crucial,
given our jus soli, or birthright citizenship, rule. 39 The jus soli
rule reflects a commitment to treating anyone born in the United
States as an equal. Understanding the processes of cultural adaptation experienced by the second generation is therefore essential to promoting equal citizenship. Relatedly, the jus soli rule
means that the status of the second generations' parents is of
similar concern, given that the parents' success will affect their
children's prospects. Because both immigration policies and the
public attitudes surrounding those policies ultimately affect the
options and status of the second generation, we must consider
whether immigration policies erect obstacles to the assimilation
of this generation.
In addition to considering the generational components of
assimilation, we must also consider that assimilation entails adjustments of different sorts; it has important cultural, economic,
and socio-political dimensions. Each of these dimensions often
reinforces the others, though it is also possible for one sort of assimilation to occur even if another is blocked. Moreover, each
aspect of assimilation may unfold at different rates for different
individual immigrants, as well as for different immigrant
groups. 40 In fact, recent sociological research shows that assimi-

38 See, for example, Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, The New Second Generation:

Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants,in Sudrez-Orozco, Sudrez-Orozco, and Qin, eds,
The New Immigration, 85, 85-86 (cited in note 18) (noting the need, in evaluating the
"new" immigration since 1965, to focus on the second generation, in addition to the immigrant generation).
39 See US Const, Amend XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and the
State wherein they reside.").
40 See Brown and Bean, Assimilation Models (cited in note 32) ("[Glroups may vary in
the apparent incompleteness of their assimilation for a number of reasons, including the
level of human capital (education) they bring with them and the social and economic
structure of the society they enter."). It is the case that
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lation has been disrupted for some groups, whose second generations find themselves less well off economically and in terms of
health outcomes and educational attainment than the immigrant
generation, contrary to conventional expectations. 41 This phenomenon of downward assimilation suggests that both immigration and integration policy should be attentive to potential differences among immigrant groups as they negotiate the processes of
assimilation--differences that often will manifest themselves in
terms of race and class.
When considering the different types of assimilation, popular consciousness focuses most immediately on cultural adaptation. Linguistic diversity suggests the presence of the unassimilated, and popular discourse often focuses on the acquisition of
English language skills as the most significant marker of adaptation. As a number of sociological studies have demonstrated, immigrant groups today follow this particular path of assimilation
in the predicted manner: the immigrant generation acquires
English-language speaking ability, the second generation acquires English proficiency but is often bilingual, and the ability
to speak the immigrant language tapers off by the third genera42
tion.
Beyond this linguistic adaptation, cultural assimilation
might also involve changes in attitudes about certain practices or
social structures that are shaped by religion and culture, such as

[dlifferent aspects of assimilation may also vary in completeness at any point in
time. For example, an immigrant may master a host-country language faster
than he or she matches the earnings of the native born. Finally, the incompleteness of assimilation may be similarly affected across groups if economic or
other structural changes were to reduce most people's chances of economic mobility.
Id.
41 See, for example, Sudrez-Orozco, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About
Assimilation at 75-77 (cited in note 18). See also Portes and Zhou, The New Second Generationat 89-90 (cited in note 38). Compare Nancy Foner and Richard Alba, The Second
Generationfrom the Last Great Wave of Immigration: Setting the Record Straight (Migration Information Source Oct 1, 2006), available at <http://www.migrationinformation.org>
(last visited Jan 20, 2007) (noting that despite popular mythology to the contrary, the
southern and eastern European immigrants of the turn of the twentieth century, particularly Italians, also faced considerable obstacles to assimilation, experiencing only a "slow
and gradual" climb into society's mainstream that was punctuated by "painful setbacks
and difficulties").
42 For studies demonstrating that post-1965 immigrants are assimilating linguistically, see Rub6n Rumbaut, Douglas S. Massey, and Frank D. Bean, Linguistic Life Expectancies: Immigrant Language Retention in Southern California,32 Population & Dev Rev
447, 454-55 (2006); Alba and Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream at 219-21 (cited
in note 29); Pew Hispanic Center, Assimilation and Language at 1 (cited in note 30).
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attitudes about family life, pre-marital sex, homosexuality, and
abortion. 43 These two forms of adaptation appear to be mutually
reinforcing, as the acquisition of English correlates with the development of attitudes more closely in line with the general
population's views. 4 4 This correlation is, of course, complicated. It
is not inexorably positive for immigrant views to approximate
the median view in the country-both because diversity of perspective is generally valuable, but also because there may well be
instances in which we would prefer the general population's values to more closely mirror immigrants' values, as might be the
case with the heightened significance many immigrants place on
family. And despite this connection between English-language
ability and convergence with median public views, the ability to
speak English is not necessarily an indication of comprehensive
assimilation, as the downward assimilation data suggest, 45 nor is
limited English-language ability necessarily a sign that immigrants have not or are not adapting to life in the United States in
other ways by holding down jobs and forming social networks.
It is also important to emphasize that the process of cultural
adaptation unfolds in a variety of settings. For immigrant children and the second generation, adaptation occurs in the public
schools, but adult immigrants simply do not have access to such
an assimilating institution. Instead, through formal adult literacy programs, the workplace, interaction with market and governmental institutions, and exposure to popular culture, adult
immigrants negotiate cultural adaptation. The cultural aspect of
assimilation is thus overarching and occurs as immigrants manage the other components of adjustment.
43 Pew Hispanic Center, Assimilation and Languageat 3-4 (cited in note 30).
44 According to a recent study by the Pew Hispanic Center there is a relationship
between linguistic assimilation and these changes in attitudes:
[LIanguage contributes to differences in attitudes substantially even after controlling for other factors, such as age, gender, level of education, income, place
of residence . . . country of origin, political party, religion, citizenship, and generation in the United States. For example, . . . it is estimated that . .. 93% of

Spanish-dominant Latinos agree that it is better for children to live in their
parents' home until they get married .... [whereas] 71% [of English-dominant
Latinos] are estimated to feel the same way.
Id at 3. The study also estimates that 70 percent of English-dominant Latinos find divorce acceptable, but only 51 percent of Spanish-dominant Latinos agree. Id.
45 Compare Portes and Zhou, The New Second Generation at 90 (cited in note 38)
(describing the experience of Haitian immigrants in Miami and noting that, contrary to
conventional expectations, "adopting the outlooks and cultural ways of the native-born
does not represent, as in the past, the first step toward social and economic mobility but
may lead to the exact opposite").
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The extent to which an immigrant has adapted to his new
surroundings can also be measured in economic and labor-based
terms. Most immigrants move in hopes of making economic
gains, and there are a number of ways of measuring economic
incorporation. One way to consider this process of adjustment is
to measure immigrants' economic fortunes-are their wages increasing; are they acquiring financial stability and security
through home ownership and greater access to health care and
other kinds of insurance; and what are the economic prospects
for the second generation? Do the rising fortunes of immigrants
themselves translate into better prospects and security for their
children? We might also consider the extent to which immigrants
emerge from immigrant-dominated sectors of the economy and
whether they and their children are working as equals of nonimmigrants in ethnically integrated workplaces. Economic advancement, like English-language acquisition, will inevitably
enable other aspects of assimilation. Entering integrated workplaces will lead to cultural and social assimilation, and enhanced
economic security may translate into political and other forms of
power. The critical question, along this dimension, is to what extent immigrants' economic fortunes are improving or becoming
more secure.
Finally, beyond the obvious cultural and economic indicia of
immigrant adaptation, other forms of adjustment to life in a new
society are also worth measuring and facilitating. Various forms
of socio-political adjustment will be part of any immigrant's transition to a full and complete life in society. Forms of social integration, such as participation in churches, schools, and community groups such as sports leagues will be part of the formation of
the social support networks essential to living a stable life. In
many instances, these networks will be made up of co-ethnics.
But it would be a mistake to consider the existence of such affiliations as a sign of failure to assimilate, for these affiliations
are crucial to the accumulation of social capital necessary for
survival and social development in a new society, and they complement or offset the challenges of entering into more integrated
environments. 46

46 Id at 90 ("[I]mmigrant youths who remain firmly ensconced in their respective
ethnic communities may, by virtue of this fact, have a better chance for educational and
economic mobility through use of the material and social capital that their communities
make available."). See also SuArez-Orozco, Everything You Wanted to Know About Assimilation at 80 (cited in note 18). Suirez-Orozco notes that:
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Immigrant social networks might also facilitate precitizenship political activity or the organization of immigrants in
defense of their interests. Examples of such organization include
participation in labor unions, which connect immigrants not only
with their own co-ethnics, but also with members of other immigrant groups and native-born Americans. 47 By participating in
what scholars have called economic or labor citizenship, 48 immigrants develop the capacity and incentive to engage fellow workers and. citizens to articulate and defend mutual interests-a
process likely to promote social connectedness as well as broader
forms of concerted or political action. The immigrants' rights
demonstrations held across the country in the spring of 2006 also
reflect a form of pre-citizenship political activity, as do efforts to
organize immigrants at the local level to agitate for government
49
attention, including the right to vote in some contexts.
By defining assimilation in cultural, economic, social, and
political terms, I am not suggesting that these concepts are
themselves singular or that other forms of adaptation are irrelevant in assessing how immigrants incorporate. Rather, this taxonomy emphasizes that assimilation is a multifaceted phenomenon whose dimensions sometimes reinforce one another, and
sometimes outpace one another for different immigrant individuals and groups.
[M]aintaining a sense of belonging and social cohesion with their immigrant
roots is equally important [to developing skills and work habits required to
thrive today]. When immigrant children lose their expressive culture, social cohesion is weakened, parental authority is undermined, and interpersonal relations suffer. The unthinking call for immigrant children to abandon their culture can only result in loss, anomie, and social disruption.
Id. See also Lily Wong Filmore, When Learning a Second Language Means Losing the
First,in Sudrez-Orozco, Subrez-Orozco, and Qin, eds, The New Immigration, 289, 302-06
(cited in note 18) (describing how children's loss of their capacity to speak a home language has dramatic implications for family relations, as well as for children's capacities to
socialize).
47 See generally Ruth Milkman, ed, Organizing Immigrants: The Challenge for Unions in Contemporary California(ILR 2000). I discuss how immigrant organizing is facilitated through the use of Spanish and other languages in Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 104 Nw U L Rev 1689 (2006). This phenomenon underscores how the process of assimilation depends on the mobilization of the "hybrid identities and bi-cultural capacities" discussed above. See Su6rez-Orozco, Everything You
Wanted to Know About Assimilation at 80 (cited in note 18).
48 See Jennifer Gordon, TransnationalLabor Citizenship, S Cal L Rev (forthcoming
2007) (articulating a concept of "labor citizenship" that refers to "participation by workers
in collective efforts to achieve recognition of and compensation for their economic contributions to society").
49 See Ron Hayduk, Democracy for All: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the
United States 63 (Routledge 2006).
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The common thread among these forms of adjustment, however, is that each depends on agency and, hence, mobility. Cultural assimilation depends on access to communities outside the
world of co-ethnics. Economic advancement similarly depends on
the ability to take advantage of the market. But the viability of
this movement also depends on immigrants' ability to withstand
its inevitable challenges. Particularly for immigrants who have
not yet learned English, achieving economic advancement depends on the existence of some kind of social safety net. This support could come in the form of accessible (for example, translated
and interpreted) government or employer assistance, but often it
comes in the form of social and political support provided by
families, immigrant social networks, and formally organized immigrant groups, as well as larger social groups with immigrant
organizing agendas, such as labor unions.
Exercising mobility thus depends on having security anchors
that compensate for the risks that movement entails. Mobility,
therefore, should not be understood as a straight line out of immigrant communities, but rather as a form of action that enables
movement in and out of immigrant sectors and that, in some
cases, depends on those sectors to make movement possible.50 In
short, incorporation requires attention not just to immigrants'
chances outside of their own communities, but also to the dynamics and hence vitality of those communities themselves.
C.

Receiving Society Adaptation

It is relatively easy to identify the types of adjustment immigrants undergo when they reach the United States, and the
fortunes of immigrants can be compared to those of the native
born, enabling us to estimate how well immigrants are adapting
to life in the United States. But what assimilation means for the
receiving society is somewhat more obscure and difficult to describe, particularly when we shift our focus from the short-term
50 Some of the latest research on immigrant assimilation describes the process as
segmented:

Instead of a relatively uniform mainstream whose mores and prejudices dictate
a common path of integration, we observe today several distinct forms of adaptation. One of them replicates the time-honored portrayal of growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle-class; a second leads straight
in the opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass; still a third associates rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's values and tight solidarity.
Portes and Zhou, The New Second Generation at 90 (cited in note 38).
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impacts caused by the initial arrival of immigrants to the medium- and longer-term changes engendered by gradually assimilating immigrants and their descendants.
Immigration clearly changes the geography of the host society, and that change is easy to see in the short term. Each period
in American immigration history is characterized by the emergence of unique immigrant neighborhoods and towns, where languages other than English thrive for some period of time, and
where ethnically defined businesses and civic groups persist even
longer. 51 But these communities change in character as time
passes. Some immigrant neighborhoods eventually disappear as
immigrants gradually integrate with the population at large over
one or two generations, perhaps maintaining ethnic restaurants
and festival-like traditions, in the spirit of New York's Little Italy. Some immigrant neighborhoods remain immigrant neighborhoods but become populated by new groups of immigrants-a
trend exemplified by the transformation of New York's Lower
East Side in the twentieth century.
This narrative of transition suggests the gradual disappearance of the immigrant identity and contribution. But surely
large-scale immigration leaves a mark on the receiving society,
even as the immigrant generation gives way to the second or
third generation and immigrant neighborhoods disappear. Perhaps the clearest long-term change that has resulted from immigration is the religious pluralism of our society. 52 Though Catholicism and Judaism as practiced today may look considerably
different from the religions as practiced by the European immigrants of the early twentieth century, religious pluralism, unlike
linguistic pluralism, has persisted across generations despite the
virulent nativism directed toward the immigrant groups that
53
brought those faiths to the United States.
Apart from these obvious transformations, the long-term
changes resulting from immigration elude straightforward
measurement; as immigrant contributions become normalized
51 Consider John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism,
1860-1925 (Rutgers 2002); Heinz Koss, The American Bilingual Tradition (Center for
Applied Linguistics and Delta Systems 1998); Aristide Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioningof America (Russell Sage 2006).
52 See, for example, David Rieff, Nuevo Catholics, NY Times Mag 640 (Dec 24, 2006)
(discussing the general decline of Catholicism in the U.S. along with its growth in Hispanic areas of the U.S.).
53 For an account of this nativism, see Higham, Strangers in the Land at 60-63, 6667, 160-61 (cited in note 51) (describing nativism directed towards Catholics, Italians,
and Jews).
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into generally accepted ideas of regional or American culture, the
immigrant origins of those contributions can be difficult to pinpoint. Take the case of the German immigration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Before World War I, the
Midwest was populated by thriving German communities. Several states supported German-language instruction in public and
parochial schools, 54 and in cities such as Milwaukee and Cincinnati, German immigrants supported their own institutions, including a robust German-language press and German voluntary
associations and churches. 55 Through a process of assimilation
accelerated by extreme public and legal coercion during World
War I, however, German ethnic identity and cultural institutions
became increasingly marginal, and the German language has
almost no presence in the United States today. 56 It nonetheless
seems implausible that German immigration had no impact on
American culture. But how would we describe that impact? Can
it be reduced to picturesque German architecture and the German-language surnames that are considered to be mainstream
American, or did German immigration have some more fundamental impact?
A second narrative of transition adds further complexity to
this picture. In some cases, despite the passage of time,
neighborhoods, towns, and even regions retain an identifiable
ethnic orientation, with varying levels of immigrant presence
interspersed among a larger population of English-dominant
residents who may still identify in some way with either the culture of origin, or some form of ethnic culture that has developed
over time inside the United States. The Latino communities of
the Southwest and major American cities exemplify this pattern.
Though it may be occurring today in unprecedented numbers,
immigration from Latin America is hardly a new phenomenon
54 See Roger Daniels, Not Like Us: Immigrants and Minorities in America, 1890-1924
64 (Ivan R Dee 1997).
55 See Frederick Luebke, Germans in the New World: Essays on the History of Immigration 167-68 (Univ of Ill Press 1990). See also Aristide Zolberg, A Nation by Design 165
(Russell Sage 2006) (noting that in the nineteenth century "an Irish and German Catholic
world established itself within a single generation as a major component of American
society, autonomous and largely self-contained, with a strong identity of its own and
elaborate institutions to nurture it").
56 John Higham describes this anti-German hysteria that took hold after 1915. Local
officials banned the sale of German newspapers, various states banned the teaching of
the German language in the public schools on the theory that the study of language
"served to inculcate un-American ideas," German opera was boycotted, sauerkraut became known as "liberty cabbage," and "many towns, firms, and individuals with German
names changed them." See Higham, Strangers in the Land at 208 (cited in note 51).
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(and Latino presence is not all the result of immigration).
Names, idioms, customs, and forms of aesthetic culture shaped
through the interaction of new immigrants and established Latino communities are etched into the identities of communities
around the country and may be accurately described as "mainstream."
The complexity of identifying long-term immigrant contributions again underscores that our immigration policy should not
attempt to achieve defined cultural outcomes. As with the process of immigrant adaptation, my primary purpose is not to identify or describe the long-term changes immigration brings to the
receiving society. Though it would provide a nice bookend to the
trans-generational work describing how immigrants have fared,
identifying the new "mainstream" that emerges with each successive wave of immigration is largely beside the point. Struggling to identify the contributions of immigrant generations after
they have first arrived distracts attention from the far more
pressing task of facilitating the absorption of the immigrants
currently seeking entry. It is sufficient to emphasize that the
receiving society changes as a result of immigration and therefore participates in and negotiates the process of assimilation,
just as immigrants do.
And just as the relevant focus of the inquiry into immigrant
adaptation should be on the process of adaptation, our focus
when considering the receiving society's transformation should
be on the mechanisms the receiving society uses to adjust-on
the reciprocal willingness and ability of the receiving society to
adapt to demographic change. The relevant descriptive questions
include: what immediate changes does the host society experience as a result of immigration, and what forms of adaptation
emerge in response?
Two central features of current immigration make this inquiry more concrete. First, as noted at the outset, a guest worker
program would primarily address migration from Mexico and
Latin America. Focusing our discussion of immigration in this
way makes the issue of receiving-society assimilation easier to
manage. The effects of migration run the gamut from the aesthetic and environmental to the structural and institutional. The
environmental effects include the prevalence of the Spanish language in public spaces, from workplaces across the country 57 to
57 I discuss in detail the impact immigration and language diversity have had on
American workplaces in Rodriguez, 104 Nw U L Rev at 1689 (cited in note 47).
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the streets and storefronts of American cities and towns, through
ever-expanding Spanish-language media, 58 and a services sector
more focused on Latino communities. Through the profusion of
Spanish-speaking students and patients, many of whom are vulnerable because of their undocumented status, public institutions such as schools and hospitals feel the immediate effects of
immigration generally, and unauthorized immigration in particular. Finally, by contributing to the growth of the Latino population, immigration is transforming the political stature of Latinos by capturing the attention of politicians looking to secure
votes, though it remains too early to specify the full extent of this
effect. 59
The second distinctive feature of current immigration is its
impact on the demography of states, suburbs, and rural areas
with limited pre-1990 experience with immigration. 60 Though
they remain concentrated in the so-called gateway states and
cities, 61 many immigrants are bypassing these traditional destinations and settling in suburban and rural areas with minimal
previous exposure to immigrant communities, as well as in states
not traditionally associated with immigration. 62 North Carolina,
for example-a state historically without a Latino population58 See generally Arlene Davila, Latinos, Inc.: The Marketing and Making of A People
(Cal 2001) (assessing how the Spanish-language media in the United States are constructing conceptions of latinidad,or Hispanic identity).
59 Early analyses of the 2006 mid-term elections noted the significance of the shift of
Latino voters from Republicans to Democrats, a shift of greater magnitude than the reorientation of blacks and whites. Pew Hispanic Center, Latinos and the 2006 Mid-term
Election 2 (Pew Hispanic Center Nov 27, 2006), available at <http://pewhispanic.org/files/
factsheets/26.pdf> (last visited Jan 20, 2007). An early study of exit poll data conducted
by the Pew Hispanic Center revealed an 11-point swing between 2004 and 2006 in favor
of Democrats, whereas the swing among white voters was 6 percent. Id. According to the
study, "something distinctive occurred among Latino voters this year that rewarded the
Democrats and punished the Republicans," id at 2, but it would be premature to connect
that "something distinctive" to the immigration issue, considering the mixed results on
the immigration question in Arizona. Id at 3. See also Maria Echeveste, Rising Tide:
What the Midterm Election Results Tell Us About Hispanic Voters, Am Prospect (Dec 22,
2006), available at <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb
&articleId=12350> (last visited Jan 20, 2007) (assessing the 2006 election results and
concluding that Latinos have nuanced views with respect to immigration and that the
Latino population in the United States is diverse linguistically, culturally, and politically).
60 See Waters and Jim6nez, 31 Ann Rev Sociol at 107 (cited in note 20) (noting that
though the regional concentration of immigration is inescapable, a statistically significant
number of immigrants have been bypassing the traditional gateway cities and states and
settling in suburban and rural communities, as well as in states that, historically, have
not received much immigration).
61 Traditional gateway states include California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois. See Alba and Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream at 9 (cited in note 29).
62 See Waters and Jim~nez, 31 Ann Rev Sociol at 107 (cited in note 20).
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has one of the fastest growing populations of Latino immigrants
63
in the country
Immigrants are transforming these new destinations demographically, and the response of the destinations' residents has
been mixed. A recently released study of five of the new immigration states reveals a similar pattern of adjustment in each
location: states and localities initially accommodate the immi64
grant influx, in some cases actively recruiting new immigrants.
This openness eventually gives way to more restrictive measures,
such as denying immigrants access to public benefits.6 5 Today's
status quo in most of these states is characterized by ambivalence, particularly when it comes to the growth of the undocumented population. Policymakers engage in regular efforts to
reconcile the commitment to accommodation with the trepidation
felt by existing residents because of their (often inaccurate) perception that their communities are becoming unrecognizable and
even dangerous due to immigration.
The proliferation in the last year of local government ordinances that would prohibit landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants or deny city contracts to employers who hire
undocumented workers represents another significant data point
in the discussion of receiving-society adaptation. 66 These ordinances are overtly addressed to the specific problem of illegal
immigration, but they arguably represent part of a larger struggle to adapt to and resist immigration more generally-a form of
resistance to demographic change. Indeed, the fact that many of
the ordinances passed include official English declarations,
which in addition to proclaiming the need for commonality also
claim that "in today's modern society, [the city] may also need to
protect and preserve the rights of those who speak only the Eng63 See Paula D. McClain, North Carolina'sResponse to Latino Immigrants and Immigration, in Greg Anrig, Jr. and Tova Andrea Wang, eds, Immigration's New Frontiers:
Experiencesfrom the Emerging Gateway States 7 (Century Foundation 2006).
64 See Greg Anrig, Jr. and Tova Andrea Wang, Introduction, in Greg Anrig, Jr. and
Tova Wang, eds, Immigration's New Frontiers:Experiences from the Emerging Gateway
States 2 (Century Foundation 2006).
65 Id. In another work, I explore the critical role that state and local governments
play in the process of immigrant integration and argue that a coherent immigration system requires state and local participation in immigration matters. See Cristina M.
Rodriguez, Mich L Rev (forthcoming 2008).
66 The Fair Immigration Reform Movement has compiled a representative list of the
local ordinances passed, as well as those defeated, since the movement began in San
Bernardino, California, whose City Council ultimately blocked the ordinance. FIRM's
documentation of the ordinances is available at <http://www.immigrationsolidarity.org/
Documents/Nov06OverviewLocalOrdinances> (last visited Jan 20, 2007).

246

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2007:

lish language," 67 suggests that the concern is not exclusively over
immigration of the illegal variety. Whether the issue is day laborers congregating on street corners, the perception of overburdened public hospitals, or the dramatic rise of non-Englishspeaking students in the local schools, local communities are
reaching for ways to handle what many people perceive to be
threats to their ways of life. In the same way that immigrants
often seek to insulate themselves from the challenges of life in a
new society by relying on networks of co-ethnics, residents of
places newly exposed to immigration strive to insulate themselves from changes they find overwhelming.
This cycle of acceptance, followed by restriction, and culminating in ambivalence, is of course not an innovation of the new
immigration states. Traditional gateway states and the federal
government cycle through these same stages, with measures like
Proposition 187 in California and Congress's 1996 immigration
overhaul representing the most recent peak of restriction. 68 The
examples of local ambivalence and resistance in the new immigration states simply underscore that discussions about how best
to ensure immigrant incorporation must include consideration of
the mechanisms and attitudes the receiving society adopts to
deal with immigration-of the coping mechanisms, so to speak.
Many of these coping mechanisms seriously complicate the
lives of immigrants. Today's local ordinances, the 1996 welfare
reforms that denied immigrants access to a range of public benefits, 69 and drives to ban bilingual education or declare English
the official language 70 all reflect resistance to immigration and
immigrant presence in some way. Whether or not these measures are preempted or constitutionally prohibited, and whether
or not they express legitimate concerns, they stand in the way of
incorporation-some more obviously than others. 71 Measures de67 See City of Hazelton, Official English Ordinance 2006-19, available at
<http://www.hazletoncity.org/homeframeset.htm> (last visited Jan 20, 2007).
68 Law of Nov 8, 1994, 1994 Calif Legis Serv Prop 187 (nullified by injunction);
IIRIRA Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-546 (1996), codified at 8 USC §§ 1101 note et
seq and 5 USC § 552 note (1996).
69 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA) significantly limited immigrant eligibility for various means tested benefits
programs. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub L No 104-193, 110 Stat 2105 (1996), codified in scattered sections of 8, 26, and 42
USC.
70 For a discussion of these initiatives, see Rodriguez, 94 Cal L Rev at 751-54, 75965 (cited in note 28).
71 Denying immigrants access to public benefits arguably impedes economic advancement by removing temporary safety nets, as well as longer term forms of insurance,

2191

GUEST WORKERS AND INTEGRATION

247

signed to limit immigrants' choices, to cut back on programs designed to assist immigrants, to exclude immigrants from participating in generally available programs and generally open institutions, or to define belonging in terms that exclude immigrants
because of language or other cultural differences, conspire to
make incorporation difficult. Again, some of these restrictions
may be justified by cost concerns and political calculations, and
some may be supported by legitimate ideological positions, but
they nonetheless add friction to the process of assimilation.
The emergence of these forms of adjustment to the perceived
problems engendered by immigration ultimately force us from
the descriptive to the normative-from assessing reaction to defining the degree of reciprocal adaptation required for immigrant
incorporation to be successful. The subsequent and inescapable
normative inquiry revolves around determining which forms of
adaptation facilitate the process of immigrant incorporation and
which forms of adaptation work at cross purposes with the goal
of incorporation. What type of reciprocity is required on the part
of the receiving society?
D.

From Adaptation to Reciprocity

In defining the term "reciprocity," I should be clear that I intend to use it in two different senses. I first consider reciprocity
such as health care coverage for adults and children alike. Though no court has ever
found a right to bilingual education, and as it has been implemented, bilingual education
has produced mixed results, the social science evidence largely suggests that well designed bilingual education programs are more effective at promoting language and other
achievement among students than English immersion programs. See H.D. Adamson,
Language Minority Students in American Schools: An Education In English 231-32
(Lawrence Erlbaum 2005) (citing research showing that well-run bilingual programs are
effective, but that not all bilingual programs are well-run); Robert E. Slavin and Alan
Cheung, A Synthesis of Research on Language of Reading Instruction for English Language Learners, 75 Rev of Educ Rsrch 247, 273 (2005) (reviewing seventeen studies of
various language programs, twelve of which found positive effects of bilingual education
and none of which found results favoring English immersion); Wayne P. Thomas and
Virginia P. Collier, A National Study of Effectiveness for Language Minority Students'
Long-Term Academic Achievement Executive Summary 7 (Center for Research on Education, Diversity and Excellence 2003), available at <http://crede.berkeley.edu/researchllaa/
1.1pdfsIl.l_01es.pdf> (last visited Apr 3, 2007) (finding that bilingually schooled students
outperformed comparably monolingually schooled students after four to seven years of
dual language instruction). Though these studies are not unassailable, and though there
is an absence of good data on the subject, this research suggests that the measures passed
by states such as Massachusetts, California, and Arizona that prohibit the use of native
language in the instruction of English language learners sacrifices policy flexibility and
rationality at the expense of immigrant children and in favor of an ideological agenda.
For more detailed discussion of this issue, see Rodriguez, 94 Cal L Rev at 758-65 (cited in
note 28).
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in a narrow sense, addressing the policy realm, by focusing on
the forms of adaptation by the receiving society that are required
to ensure a peaceful process of immigrant assimilationreciprocity as a mechanism of integration. The question, under
this definition of reciprocity, becomes what sorts of attitudes or
practices adopted by the receiving society aid the process of assimilation.
But I also intend reciprocity to have a broader meaning,
based on the conceptions of social obligation and mutual cooperation that ought to characterize a liberal society. The obligation to
adopt immigration policies that promote the integration of immigrants represents the flipside of the obligation put on immigrants to adapt. This concept of reciprocity is, in a sense, a form
of ideal theory. Though it is based on an appreciation of current
demographic realities, its focus is on the ideal way of adapting to
those realities.
In taking this approach, I acknowledge that the U.S. has a
long tradition of reciprocity failures or nativist reactions to new
immigrant groups. Often the forms of adaptation adopted by
Americans in response to immigration have been coercive and
exclusionary, as the preceding discussion makes clear. The classic work on American nativism remains John Higham's Strangers in the Land,7 2 which is filled with examples of anti-immigrant
measures that have analogues today, though generally in less
extreme form. Nativism as a form of host society adjustment
thus may be inescapable, and it complicates the reciprocity question by introducing the dilemmas of politics into the equation. If
there is an absence of political will to support an immigration
policy that will promote integration, either because the public
has temporarily rejected the goal of integration, or because it
cannot see the connection between immigrant-friendly policies
and long-term assimilation, 73 then policymakers will be in a bind.
On the one hand, the persistence of anti-immigrant anxiety
should lead policymakers to attempt to counteract these tendencies as best they can, by trying to inject rationality into the policy
process and use immigration policy to encourage and obligate
Americans to act reciprocally. At the same time, to prevent antiimmigrant backlash or to achieve a second best solution when

72 Higham, Strangers in the Land (cited in note 51).
73 The political climates that produced Proposition 187 and the 1996 immigration and
welfare reforms could be said to reflect both circumstances.
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perfect policies are not achievable, policymakers must sometimes
compromise.
Because I recognize the fickleness of Americans' attitudes
toward immigrants and immigration, I take two tacks in the remainder of this Article. I first and foremost emphasize the sorts
of reciprocity that will best facilitate integration, as well as the
types of reciprocity we ought to exhibit-factors I argue in Part
II should lead us to reject temporary worker programs. But in a
concession to the difficult politics of the immigration issue, I also
consider in Part II how a guest worker program, as a second best
solution, could be devised to meet the requirements of reciprocity
74
as closely as possible, given current political constraints.
1. Reciprocity as a matter of policy.
As I have noted, we must take large-scale immigration as a
given and focus on what happens to immigrants and the host
society alike as immigrants build new lives in the United States.
By accepting that a certain amount of low-skilled Latin American immigration is inevitable for push and pull reasons, I begin
from the same premise as those who champion guest worker programs, because those champions seek to channel what are now
illegal forms of immigration through legal channels. Channeling
this inevitable immigration through expanded legal mechanisms
is certainly preferable to the status quo. It is also preferable to a
policy posture that places unrealistic faith in new technology's
74 For a similar approach, see Howard F. Chang, Immigration and the Workplace:
Immigration Restrictionsas Employment Discrimination,78 Chi Kent L Rev 291 (2003).
Chang observes that guest worker policies are only second-best policies from the perspective of principles of liberal justice, but that they represent an improvement over the
status quo and are an acceptable compromise in a world in which Americans appear
unwilling to bear the burdens that more liberal policies would impose. Id at 294-95.
Chang takes the position that liberal ideals of equality require us to treat all individuals
with equal concern, which makes our immigration restrictions difficult to justify and
tantamount to a form of employment discrimination, given that the restrictions prevent
would-be immigrants from accessing jobs in the U.S. economy on the basis of immutable
characteristics. Id at 295-303. He concedes, however, that "[t]he self-interest of natives
... is bound to impose constraints of political feasibility on the availability of immigrant
visas," and that "[a]s long as natives are limited in their willingness to bear fiscal burdens, they are likely to restrict alien access to permanent residence." Id at 322. The resulting restrictions "would likely exclude many unskilled aliens from the U.S. labor market unless they are willing to immigrate illegally or have access to guest worker visas."
Change, 78 Chi Kent L Rev at 322. Given these political constraints, guest worker programs "may represent the only alternative to illegal immigration for aliens otherwise
excluded from the U.S. labor market", and therefore these programs would enhance the
welfare of natives and immigrants alike, compared to the "politically feasible alternatives." Id at 323.
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ability to seal the border and then attempts to manage subsequent crises of illegal immigration through post-hoc legalization
efforts. But then critical questions arise: what legal mechanisms
should we devise? Through what forms of adjustment should the
receiving society facilitate the incorporation of these inevitable
immigrants? The design of these legal mechanisms-an issue I
consider in detail in Part II-is crucial.
As a general matter, reciprocity requires a willingness to assist as well as a willingness to adapt. Willingness to assist might
take the form of a commitment to providing translation and interpretation services in the public and private sectors in order to
make institutional bureaucracies and social institutions navigable to non-English-speaking immigrants. The willingness to devote resources to such services acknowledges that the process of
learning English takes time, but it also reflects what might seem
counterintuitive: translation and interpretation are mechanisms
of integration. They build immigrants' trust in and understanding of the public sphere, and they help immigrants develop social
and cultural capital in the form of knowledge of the systemcapital that need not depend on an ability to speak English. Willingness to assist might take the shape of making public programs available to citizens also available to immigrants, reversing the spirit of the 1996 immigration reforms. Finally, willingness to assist might also include indicating openness to immigrants as political actors, by granting them voting rights, perhaps initially in local elections, or by responding to their political
manifestations, such as the spring 2006 demonstrations, as we
would respond to the political mobilizations of fellow citizensnot with incredulousness, but with recognition of the legitimacy
of their concerns and a willingness to consider them in policy debates.
The meaning of willingness to adapt is more elusive. At bottom it requires openness to change, even when that change disrupts one's environment. Signs of adaptation might include liberal views toward future immigration, a public discourse that
focuses less on sealing the border than on practical responses to
demographic changes, or more widespread public recognition of
the net benefits that immigration generates for the United
States and the hemisphere as a whole.
In the context of the current debate, willingness to adapt
should translate into willingness to increase substantially the
number of unskilled immigrants permitted to enter legallyanother assumption I share with those who support guest worker
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programs. This type of adaptation reflects the realization that we
cannot enforce our way out of the illegal immigration problemeither because increased enforcement is unlikely to succeed in
suppressing the market forces at work, or because the cost of optimal enforcement is too high, given that immigration produces
economic benefits to the country.
In fact, as I already have suggested, to fail to adapt in this
way would be to perpetuate the status quo of high levels of undocumented immigration-a circumstance that would substantially impede immigrant assimilation. Undocumented status,
which really means the absence of legal status, impedes integration because of the obvious constraints it places on the individual
immigrant and his family from operating as fully functional
members of society. Moreover, the presence of a large undocumented population erodes public support for immigration and
prompts the adoption of restrictions that often affect legal immigrants and their co-ethnic citizens. 75 The equation of immigration with lawlessness creates trepidation regarding immigration.
While it is difficult to isolate the extent to which the current
batch of restrictive proposals at the federal, state, and local levels are a response to the mushrooming of the undocumented
population, as opposed to more general ambivalence about immigration itself, neutralizing the discourse of illegality would cer76
tainly help soften attitudes toward immigration.
Finally, willingness to adapt includes openness to the possibility that American culture will come to resemble immigrant
culture. This openness might include adopting some of the customs of immigrant groups (forms of celebration, holiday observances, or cuisine), or targeting media, entertainment, advertising, and consumer products to immigrant preferences. More significant signs of adaptation would entail open as opposed to
closed attitudes toward language difference-rules that accept
75 See, for example, Yvonne Abraham, Denied licenses, legal immigrants sue state
Registry, Boston Globe Ai (Dec 15, 2006) (reporting on the filing of a class-action lawsuit
claiming that employees of the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles, in their efforts
to ensure that undocumented immigrants are not issued drivers licenses, are denying
lawful immigrants licenses); Press release by MALDEF, LULAC, NCLR, NALEO, National Latino Organizations Express Concern about Recent Immigration Raids (Dec 21,
2006), available at <http://www.nclr.org/content/news/detail/43451/> (last visited Jan 20,
2007) (condemning the December raids by ICE of the Swift meat packing plants for,
among other things, racial profiling and targeting of lawful permanent residents).
76 Support for a guest worker program might seem, at first glance, to be precisely the
sort of adaptation I am suggesting. But though a temporary worker program would be
preferable to the status quo, for reasons I explore at length in Part II, it is not the form of
adaptation policymakers should adopt.

252

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2007:

linguistic pluralism in certain settings, such as in the workplace
or in public spaces, rather than rules that prohibit the speaking
of non-English, or attempts to drive languages other than English out of the public sphere. 77 In its most developed form, this
kind of adaptation would include willingness on the part of native English speakers to learn Spanish or other widely spoken
languages. It also would involve acceptance by the white population of its status as one of many ethnic groups, as opposed to the
dominant ethnic group. Whites would have to accept the status,
78
in certain parts of the country, as a minority.
Our history is full of examples of these sorts of adaptations,
just as it is full of instances of restrictions like the local ordinances currently being debated. The point of exploring the meaning of willingness to assist and adapt is not to suggest that these
forms of adaptation would require a wholesale rethinking of our
responses to immigration, nor that all immigrant admissions
policies must bear these hallmarks. Rather, this discussion highlights the attitudes and tendencies we should foster when debating how to rework our immigration policy to respond to changing
pressures on our borders.
2. Reciprocity as obligation.
As I have framed them thus far, questions of reciprocity are
first and foremost matters of policy. But these complex policy
questions are not wholly separable from the discrete and equally
difficult questions of moral and political obligation. Adaptation
by the host society, in addition to facilitating assimilation by reducing the friction that the arrival of new immigrants inevitably
produces, is also arguably required as a matter of obligation-a
point emphasized by the 1997 Commission on Immigration Reform, which employed the language of obligation to describe the
79
responsibilities of both immigrants and the receiving society.
Even if a guest worker program serves the function of reducing
illegal immigration, or is reasonably conducive to integration, it
might not meet the demands of political fairness or justice.
77 I have discussed the English-only workplace rule as a sign of reluctance to adapt at
length in Rodriguez, 104 Nw U L Rev at 1689 (cited in note 47).
78 See Myers, Immigrants and Boomers at 38 (cited in note 23) (considering California, where whites are no longer a majority of the population, as a "bellwether state" that
should motivate Americans to consider immigrant integration as an investment in the
country's future).
79 See United States Commission on Immigration Reform Report to Congress, Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy 28 (1997).
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But from where does the obligation to integrate immigrants
come, and what is its scope? Political theorists have given sustained attention to the rights nation-states possess to exclude
immigrants, as well as to the obligations nation-states have to
admit certain types of migrants, namely refugees.8 0 But little
consideration has been given to the extent to which Americans
might have obligations to integrate not only the immigrants
Congress admits, but also those who have crossed and will continue to cross our borders illegally. Indeed, much of the discussion of immigration and justice accepts the assumption that we
have the ability to control who enters the United States and to
shape the body politic according to standards that conform to
conceptions of justice, or to conceptions of who we want in our
society.
A number of political philosophers, in addressing the phenomenon of globalization and the rise of international systems
and institutions, have made the claim that institutional relationships beyond those set up by the nation-state connect individuals
of different citizenships to one another, imposing obligations of
justice on their relationships. As Iris Marion Young has explained in her analysis of the anti-sweatshop movement, these
theorists posit that
reciprocal obligations of justice obtain between most if not
all [people,] not simply because they are human nor because they live under the same political constitution, but
because they all depend to some degree on schemes of social cooperation which they presuppose in making their
own plans or to which they contribute by their actions.8 '
It is, of course, difficult to pinpoint individual responsibility for
these large-scale relationships, particularly when individuals do
not represent the primary cause of these relationships, 8 2 but the
80 For a series of essays on this topic, see Warren F. Schwartz, ed, Justice in Immigration (Cambridge 1995). See also Michael Blake, Discretionary Immigration, 30 Philosophical Topics 273, 273 (2002) (defining discretionary immigration as "immigration...
wherein the decision to admit the prospective immigrant is not itself demanded by liberal
morality").
sl See Iris Marion Young, Responsibility & Global Labor Justice, 12 J of Pol Phil 365,
373 (2004).
82 See Samuel Scheffier, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought 39 (Oxford 2001) ("[W]hen an outcome is the joint result of
the actions of a number of people, including ourselves, we tend to see our own agency as
implicated to a much lesser extent than we do when we take an effect to have resulted
solely from our own actions.").
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fact of general social participation in these interdependent structures supports the notion that members of societies have obligations to one another by virtue of this participation.
How far these obligations extend, of course, is the difficult
question. The answer must turn on the nature of the relationship
under consideration. My claim here is that the case for interconnectedness giving rise to obligation is stronger and easier to define in the context of immigration than within a more general
and amorphous framework of global justice. Because of conditions of interdependence, we can speak of our relationship to
immigrants in the language of political obligation, whether those
immigrants are here in compliance with the terms set out by
Congress or in violation of them.
The circumstances of immigration only heighten the salience
of this interdependency argument and make the scope of the obligation somewhat easier to discern. As Alejandro Portes and
Rub6n Rumbaut demonstrate, Mexican migration to the U.S. in
particular is the result not of "individual calculations of gain,"
but of "forces buried deep in the history of the relationships between both nations."8 3 Those forces are, of course, economic, and
have been accelerated by the North American Free Trade
Agreement, resulting in Mexico becoming "the real labor reservoir for the American economy."8 4 But they are also the result of
85
a history of contact and colonization between the two societies.
The upshot of these observations is that migration, particularly
from Mexico and Latin America, is the product not only of our
own current economic needs and choices, but also of the economic
and foreign policy choices that preceded us. In other words, immigration to the United States is the function of choices of which
we as a society are the authors. These choices have given rise to
an interdependence not only with immigrants who have already
arrived, but also with future immigrants, which in turn requires
us to recognize certain reciprocal obligations that arise from our
associations with others, regardless of borders.
But what is the content of those reciprocal obligations? Why
is the obligation not fulfilled in the form of foreign aid or through
83 See Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America at 352 (cited in note 21). See also
Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 99 Am J Sociol at 1500 (cited in note 21) (describing the
self-perpetuating character of migration networks).
84 Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America at 352 (cited in note 21) ("[B]y reason of
size, geographic proximity, and history, Mexico has become the real labor reservoir of the
American economy.").
85 Id at 353.
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fair trade policies? This obligation must be reflected in our immigration policy, for the simple reason that our interdependence
with Latin America does not just produce certain conditions
abroad, it has given rise to and will continue to give rise to populations of actual people within our borders. In other words, the
consequences of our interdependence are intimate and immediate and result in person-to-person relationships that are not
simply abstract, as in the context of globalization, but physical
and real. That this interdependence has produced in-person
forms of association creates an obligation and need for social cooperation in the context of American society, which in turn
should translate into an obligation to share spaces and institutions-both social and political.
The fact that much immigrant presence today is unauthorized by our law does not undermine these points. Indeed, the interdependence that exists as a matter of fact, despite the absence
of legal sanction, simply underscores that interdependence is the
product of decentralized choices by market participants and family and social networks, not just the product of decisions by a
centralized sovereign. The significance of immigrants' presence
as the result of our interdependence is only heightened by the jus
soli rule of citizenship; their presence means that children born
while they are here, as a matter of constitutional right, belong to
our political community, tightening the associative connections
between U.S. citizens and the people from other societies with
whom we associate through immigration.
This interdependence, resulting in physical and social interconnectedness on U.S. soil, provides the strongest basis to support an obligation to incorporate immigrants, but the obligation
to integrate current and would-be immigrants might also come
from the fact that Americans generally benefit from immigration.8 6 The obligation could stem from the fact that we choose
neither where we are born, nor into what station we are born,
86 There is an active debate among economists about whether and the extent to which
the United States benefits from immigration. There appears to be a strong consensus that
the economy as a whole benefits but that the costs are largely born by low-wage American
workers with limited education. These redistributive consequences should not be dismissed, but they are limited and arguably better dealt with through more direct forms of
intervention and training than immigration restrictions. For a discussion of this literature, see generally Chang, 78 Chi Kent L Rev at 305-16 (cited in note 74); Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, NY Times Mag (July 7, 2006). It is also worth pointing
out that the interests of these low-wage workers are least well served by the existing
system of undocumented immigration and would likely be best served by a system that
admitted low-skilled workers for permanent residence, because those workers would have
the strongest incentives and greatest freedom to advocate for higher labor standards.

256

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2007:

and we therefore have no inherent entitlement to restrict movement between social strata and locales. Certainly the obligation
lies somewhere between the obligations we owe to our compatri87
ots and our cosmopolitan duties to others throughout the world.
Ultimately, the obligation to integrate is based on a necessary expansion of the political community beyond the community
of U.S. citizens and those admitted for lawful permanent residence to those with whom, through the ebb and flow of migration, we will predictably and consistently associate-not only in
the sense of hemispheric economic interdependence, but through
the quotidian person-to-person contacts that this interdependence produces-relationships that will arise with or without legal
sanction. Those who fall into this category are not truly strangers, and the citizen/stranger dichotomy on which many existing
theories of mutual obligation depend does not fully address the
state of affairs implicated in today's immigration debate.
For a variety of reasons, it is vital that this question of obligation inform our immigration policy debates and that it do so
with reference to specific forms of interdependence, as the nature
of obligation will change depending on the nature of the relationship under examination. First, immigration policy, by exerting
control over the migration of people into the United States, implicates the United States as a sovereign entity and therefore
implicates not only the interests of U.S. citizens and residents
and their domestic labor needs, but also the proper role of the
United States in the world and the interests of other sovereigns
and their people. As such, immigration policy should be informed
by the obligations owed by the United States and its people to
the world beyond its borders-particularly to the extent that the
world crosses our borders. Second, it is critical to effective selfgovernment that our basic treatment of participants in our political community be animated by an appropriate and considered
appreciation of the obligations we owe to others, including those
who are not citizens and those who have not yet secured the
87 For a discussion of the concept of mutual aid owed to strangers, see Walzer,
Spheres of Justice at 33 (cited in note 17). See also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 114
(Belknap 1971). For a discussion of the duties we owe strangers from a cosmopolitan
perspective, see generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiersof Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Belknap 2006) (articulating a theory of justice that assures
that all people are able to realize what she calls "human capabilities"); Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The CapabilitiesApproach (Cambridge 2000);
Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law, 116 Yale L J 1022 (2007) (discussing recent efforts by
Martha Nussbaum and Kwame Anthony Appiah to make theories of cosmopolitanism
useful to political theory discussions).
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right to remain in the United States. Finally, theoretical debates
concerning questions of global justice require an appreciation of
how members of one nation-state might be bound to other actors
that circulate within their sphere of influence but yet remain
outside formal definitions of citizenship.
Deciding how far to extend this conception of political community will certainly be difficult; populations of migrants will
shade into a global population to which the United States might
owe obligations as matters of cosmopolitan concern or global justice-obligations necessarily different than those owed fellow
citizens. This idea of obligation to integrate also intersects with
88
myriad debates about open borders versus immigration control,
the nature of membership in a polity, and theories of global justice,8 9 and therefore, my discussion here has only scratched the
surface. In Part II, I explore why guest worker policies do not
adequately respect the imperatives I have just outlined, but the
full parameters of our obligation to integrate and adapt will necessarily be a subject for future work.
II. GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS AND THE
THREAT TO IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION
At first glance, guest worker programs appear to be designed
in the pragmatic spirit I advocate in Part I. By channeling what
would otherwise be illegal immigration through legal channels, a
guest worker program would deal with the illegality factor currently poisoning public opinion on immigration, but in a way that
promises little long-term change. Also, by promising to provide
guest workers with labor protections, the policy makes a legal
commitment to improving the status of otherwise vulnerable individuals, thereby undercutting the depressive effects of illegal
labor on wages.
Guest worker programs are also consistent with contemporary trends in immigration policy toward the use of temporary
visas. In 2004, only 38 percent of lawful permanent residents had
arrived initially on permanent visas or as refugees or asyleesstatuses that convert automatically to permanent residence-a
88 Compare Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49
Rev of Polit 251, 251-52 (1987) (arguing that Rawlsian, Nozickian, and utilitarian theory
all support a concept of open borders, which reflects the deep commitment of liberal societies to respect all people as free and equal) with Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 39-41, 60
(cited in note 17).
89 See Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 Philosophy & Pub Aff 113,
129-30 (2005); Blake, 30 Philosophical Topics 273 (cited in note 80).
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figure down from the 60 percent level between 1998 and 1999.90
Indeed, the allure of the temporary worker has exerted a strong
pull on labor-based admissions in particular. Today, more of our
labor needs are filled by workers on temporary visas than by lawful permanent residents ("LPRs"). According to the Migration
Policy Institute, in fiscal year 2004, the United States admitted
nearly 1.5 million temporary workers, trainees, and their dependents, but only 155,330 new LPRs through the employmentbased admissions categories. 9 1 In addition, a number of smallscale guest worker programs have long existed in the agricul92
tural sector.
The fact that our system is coming to look increasingly like
the German model, under which no one is initially admitted for
permanent residency, should give us pause, given the difficulties
German society has had integrating its immigrant populations,
at least relative to the United States. 93 And a few distinctive features of the phenomenon that has inspired guest worker proposals should make us particularly skeptical of accelerating the
trend toward the temporary. First, the problem of illegal immigration to which a guest worker program is being proposed as a
solution is enormous in scale and cross-cutting in scope. The undocumented population has reached at least 11.5 million people,
and an average of 500,000 new undocumented immigrants have
arrived each year since 2000. 94 Unlike existing programs in the
90 See Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and
Citizenship in the United States 141 (Oxford 2006).
91 See Deborah Waller Meyers, Temporary Worker Programs: A Patchwork Policy
Response 3 (Migration Policy Institute January 2006) available at <http:lwww.
migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TFIl12-Meyers.pdf> (last visited Jan 20, 2007). Note that
only 5,000 LPR visas are available per year in the employment categories for unskilled
workers and workers with the equivalent of a bachelor of arts degree. See 8 USC
§ 1153(b)(3)(B) (establishing that no more than 10,000 visas can be made available to
unskilled workers per year); Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act,
Pub L 105-100, 111 Stat 2160 (1997) (allocating 5,000 LPR visas from the 10,000 available to unskilled workers to beneficiaries of NACARA) see also Aleinikoff, Martin, and
Motomura, Immigration and Citizenship at 281, n 3 (cited in note 37) (noting that the
number of LPR visas for unskilled workers will likely be 5,000 for decades to come, in
light of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act).
92 For detailed discussion of these programs, see Philip Martin, Manolo Abella, and
Christiane Kuptsch, Managing Labor Migration in the Twenty-first Century 94-98, 10510 (Yale 2006).
93 See Motomura, 59 Stan L Rev at 869-70 (cited in note 26).
94 See Passel, The Size and Characteristicsof the Undocumented Population in the
United States at i (cited in note 1). See also Office of Immigration Statistics, US Dept of
Homeland Security, 2005 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (2006), available at
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbookl2005/OIS-2005_Yearbook.pdf>
(last visited Jan 20, 2007) (presenting various immigration statistics).
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agricultural sector, the new guest worker proposals would cut
across sectors of the economy, making the programs more unwieldy and less susceptible to the cyclical rhythms that characterize harvesting cycles. What is more, the increasing flow of undocumented immigrants is not simply the result of labor market
demands, but also the result of network effects discussed in Part
I and the strong impulse to join family already in the United
States. 95 The ambition behind the programs is thus substantial,
and the impact of failure on public opinion and on the immigration system as a whole would be correspondingly significant.
Second, in contrast to the current flow of temporary visa
holders who come from all over the world and from across the
economic spectrum, the phenomenon that a guest worker program is meant to address comes predominantly from Mexico and
Latin America 96 in the form of unskilled workers. This concentration compounds the danger that a temporary program would
create a separable and identifiable caste97 of workers with limited social capital stemming from their low-skilled status, limited
participation rights, and tenuous purchase on public policy debates, all of which would be reinforced by their temporary presence, even assuming standard labor protections apply. 98 It is not
95 These family members inside the U.S. may be unable to petition for their relatives
to enter because of their undocumented status or the considerable backlogs in the family
preference categories, which are particularly severe for people seeking entry from Mexico
and may be preventing legal family reunification, thus giving rise to illegal migration.
See Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America at 18 (cited in note 21) (noting that "[once
migrant networks have consolidated, they can become sufficiently powerful to sustain the
movement in the absence of the original economic incentives").
96 The Pew Hispanic Center has estimated that 78 percent of the current undocumented population has come from Mexico and the rest of Latin America-56 percent from
the former and 22 percent from the latter. See Passel, Size and Characteristicsof the
Undocumented Population in the United States at i-ii (cited in note 1).
97 Or, in the terms of Carolene Products footnote 4, a discrete and insular minority.
United States v CaroleneProducts, 304 US 144, 153 n 4 (1938).
98 In his critique of guest worker programs, Michael Walzer relies on a similar distinction between the migrants likely to become guest workers, and those who migrate
temporarily on other sorts of visas-the university professor or high tech engineer who
might come as a provisional worker through a so-called nonimmigrant visa. Walzer,
Spheres of Justice at 60 (cited in note 17). His argument, which I discuss in more detail in
Part II B, is that all people who live and work in a society should have equal right to
participate in it. Id. The obvious response to this claim is that surely the "technical advisor" or the "visiting university professor" would not qualify for such status. Walzer concludes that these temporary workers are "not very important," because "it is in the nature
of their privileged positions that they are able to call upon the protection of their home
states if they ever need it." Id. This response is not wholly satisfactory, but there is something significant to the idea that the constraints of a temporary visa do not inhibit the
mobility of a high-tech or academically elite immigrant in the same way that they constrain the options of an unskilled laborer, both because of the nature of their respective
employers, and because of the fact that they are likely to be received in different ways by
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insignificant that this class of workers would bear national origins, ethnicities, and cultural characteristics with which the
United States and Americans already have a complex relationship of antagonism and discrimination.
In assessing the relationship between guest worker programs and immigrant mobility, it is important to note that guest
worker programs could take one of two general forms. Most programs are designed to recruit foreign workers to meet temporary
labor market demands and then rotate those workers out of the
visa programs, and out of the country, once the labor market or
political climate has changed. But a guest worker program also
could include a path to permanent residence and then citizenship
for those workers who meet certain qualifications. In this section,
I assess the mobility and reciprocity questions assuming that a
guest worker program would take the former shape. I then consider the viability of a guest worker program with a path to permanent residence as a second-best option.
Guest worker programs, under the strictly temporary model,
are likely to include several basic design features. Visas would
authorize migrants to work for limited periods of time; recent
proposals set the limit at two to three years. 99 Most current proposals also would permit guest workers to renew their visas once,
resulting in a maximum stay of four to six years. Some proposals
would require workers to return home to renew their visas. 10 0
Most existing proposals would tie the issuance of a visa to
particular employers, some of whom might be pre-screened as
participants in the program, others of whom will be required to
go through a bureaucratic labor certification process once they
have identified particular workers they would like to hire. 10 1 The
crucial question then becomes one of portability: can a worker
who loses his job or who would prefer alternative employment,
perhaps in a different industry or in a different city or state,
the host society.
99 See, for example, Talking Nonsense, Wash Post at A14 (cited in note 13) (discussing President Bush's latest proposal to limit guest worker visas to six years total and
require visa holders to leave the country every two years for six months at a time). See
also Migration Information Source, Side-by-Side Chart for Major Immigration Legislation
Pending in 109th Congress (listing the visa terms for various bills), available at
(last visited June 23,
<http://www.migrationpolicy.orgITFIAF/legislationjan06.pdf'>
2007).
100 See Migration Information Source, Side-by-Side Chart (cited in note 99).
101 See id. The specifics of this process obviously depend on legislative design, but a
guest worker program is likely to require that an employer engage in a period of recruitment of U.S. workers, make a commitment to pay the prevailing wage, and to abide by
basic labor law protections.
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carry his work authorization with him? In the event of job loss,
most visa programs would grant the worker a certain number of
days to find new employment, but under most program formulations, the new employer must also be officially certified to participate in the program. 10 2 In other words, unlike lawful permanent residents, a guest worker, even under a portability regime,
would not have complete freedom to move in the economy. Finally, some guest worker programs would permit a visa holder to
bring his or her spouse and dependents to the United States, but
none of the programs currently proposed would permit the
spouse to work.103
A.

Guest Workers and Immigrant Mobility

As I argue in the sections that follow, strictly temporary
guest worker programs are not conducive to immigrant mobility
along any of the dimensions outlined in Part I. The constraints
on immigrant mobility will vary, however, depending on the immigrant's intent. Two types of migrants are at issue. Guest
worker programs constrain the mobility of what I call temporary
workers with temporary intent, or the mobility of workers who
may intend to return to their countries of origin, but who may
well spend extended periods of time in the United States. Temporary programs also thwart the mobility of those migrants
whose ultimate desire is a more permanent form of residence in
the United States-temporary workers with permanent intent. I
consider each in turn.
1. Temporary migrants with temporary intent.
Up to this point, I have defined immigrant mobility as mobility within the context of American life. This formulation of mobility amounts to the ability to take advantage of opportunities inside the United States and to acquire the social capital necessary
for integration into American institutions. But another way of
conceptualizing immigrant mobility is in terms of freedom to
move across the border or to live a transnational life by participating in two different societies, with different allegiances to either side of the border. Guest worker programs are conceptually
consistent with a growing appreciation among scholars of the
cyclical nature of migration. They are also consistent with the
102 See, for example, id.

103 See, for example, id.
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desire of policymakers on both sides of the border to facilitate the
temporary migration that serves the labor needs of the United
States, the development needs of Mexico, 10 4 and the individual
and familial needs of the migrants themselves. 10 5 Indeed, many
migrants who travel to the United States, particularly those who
enter through unlawful channels, initially intend to stay for only
a brief period. Their migration is motivated by a number of factors, including the desire to support a family, to make major purchases or finance home construction, or to fund small business
ventures in the home country-all projects difficult to commence
in a low-wage society that lacks credit and insurance structures. 10 6 These migrants follow preexisting migration networks,
so their actions might not match up perfectly with market dynamics. But their intent to engage in va y ven (come and go) is
clear at the outset of their migration.
Perversely, as social scientists are increasingly uncovering,
U.S. border enforcement policy is thwarting the cyclical nature of
migration, making it more difficult for people to return to their
home countries. 10 7 Observers and critics of increased border en104 A guest worker program would, for example, serve the development needs of Mex-

ico and other countries heavily dependent on remittances sent by their citizens from the
United States. Remittances to Latin America from the United States were expected to
reach $45 billion in 2006. Multilateral Investment Fund, Inter-American Development
Bank, Sending Money Home (cited in note 5). The continuation of this flow depends on
migrants' retaining a strong attachment to their home countries, namely through the
continued presence of their families there. This development strategy thus depends on
temporary forms of migration that not only secure the flow of funds, but also ensure the
return of a substantial portion of able-bodied citizens, rather than on permanent forms of
migration that enable workers to move their families to the United States, thus weakening the connection to the home country. It is estimated that the total income for immigrants in the United States is about $500 billion. Id. Approximately 10 percent of these
earnings is sent home as remittances, but more than 90 percent is spent in the local
economies where immigrants reside. Id.
105 For an excellent example of scholarship exploring the possibility of facilitating
transnational forms of citizenship and work, see Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor
Citizenship, 80 S Cal L Rev 503 (2007) (proposing a new way of structuring labor migration that links permission to enter the United States to membership in an international
network of worker organizations through which migrants would commit to refusing to
work under conditions that violate labor laws).
106 See Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America at 16-18 (cited in note 21).
107 See Mireya Navarro, Traditional Round Trip for Workers Is Becoming a One-Way
Migration North, NY Times Al (Dec 21, 2006) ("Having run the gauntlet of enforcement
resources at the border, migrants grew reluctant to repeat the experience and hunkered
down to stay, causing rates of return migration to fall sharply.") (quoting Princeton sociologist Douglas S. Massey). Navarro also notes that "[tlhe 2005 census in Mexico counted
242,000 Mexicans who said they had lived in the United States and had returned to Mexico from 2000 to 2005," and that, "[b]y comparison, a 1992 survey counted 955,000 people
who said they had returned in the previous five years." Id. Also, "[t]he average probability
of return for illegal immigrants was 47 percent during 1979-84 but fell to 27 percent
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forcement have emphasized that the amplification of enforcement at urban crossings, which began in the 1980s and continued vigorously through the Clinton years and in the aftermath of
the attacks of September 11, has not only forced migrants to
cross the border through treacherous desert terrain, but it also
has essentially trapped migrants inside the United States. Because the cost of crossing the border has become so high, migrants who cross successfully are becoming less and less likely to
return to their countries of origin after a brief stint in the U.S.,
opting instead for an extended presence, for fear that they will be
unable to return in the future.10 8 In other words, heavy border
enforcement appears to be interrupting what would otherwise be
a natural coming and going of migrants, transforming it instead
into a seemingly permanent or semi-permanent resettlement in
the United States.
There are at least two ways to think about how these findings should inform our immigration policy. 10 9 On the one hand,
we could think of strong border enforcement as a constant. In the
current political climate, it certainly seems unlikely that relaxation of border enforcement will emerge as a policy option. And
support for stepped-up enforcement is likely to be the tradeoff for
any policies that expand the number of legal immigrants in the
United States, whether through earned legalization programs,
guest worker programs, or a reevaluation of the caps on permaduring 1997-2003." See id, citing Massey. Other factors that have contributed to the
decline in cyclical migration include immigrants' increasing settlement in states far from
the border, which makes return migration more costly and harder to effectuate, and immigrants' increasing employment in jobs outside the agricultural sector, meaning they
have more stable employment that is less subject to seasonal variations. See id.
108 See Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and
Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Free Trade 128-33 (Russell Sage 2002).
Massey, Durand, and Malone note that by increasing the psychic and economic costs of
border crossing, U.S. border enforcement policy has had the unintended effect of reducing
return migration to Mexico. Id. See also Fernando Riosmena, Return Versus Settlement
Among Undocumented Mexican Migrants, 1980 to 1996, in Jorge Durand and Douglas S.
Massey, eds, Crossing the Border: Research from the Mexican Migration Project 265, 27879 (Russel Sage 2004) (noting the decline in return migration during the 1990s caused by
changes in U.S. immigration policy).
109 First, we might assume that tough border enforcement is one of the background
conditions against which we should construct our policy. The current political climateand the general political environment regarding matters of border enforcement-is
unlikely to support a scaling down of border presence, and strong enforcement measures
are arguably an inevitable trade-off that must be made to secure liberalization in other
areas. If we take border enforcement as a given, facilitating cyclical migration becomes
more difficult. To be sure, tough border measures could be passed alongside a guest
worker program, but for reasons I discuss in more detail below, the interaction of guest
worker programs with border enforcement may well produce a situation worse than the
one we have now.
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nent admissions. With border enforcement held constant, a guest
worker program may temporarily reduce the undocumented
population by creating additional legal mechanisms for crossing
the border. But once the terms of the guest worker visas expire
or a guest worker runs afoul of bureaucratic requirements, there
is no reason to believe that the migrants who obtained the guest
worker visas initially won't behave in the same way as their
counterparts who cross the border illegally, staying for long, albeit temporary, periods of time, whether with legal status or not.
This phenomenon is more likely to occur if the guest worker visas made available are for short periods of time or do not include
generous renewal provisions. In other words, a guest worker program will not necessarily foster cyclical migration if border enforcement makes re-crossings too costly. Guest worker programs
will bring immigrants in with greater ease, but then border policies, along with other factors that make continued presence attractive, will trap those workers who have exhausted the temporary visa system but who have ongoing interest in remaining in
the United States.
But what if borders were more open, or easier to cross? Perhaps if the hemispheric labor market were permitted to operate
without the constraints of border enforcement, we would see the
flowering of the transnational lifestyle. If, in a world without
strong border enforcement, more migrants would follow the cyclical migration patterns that benefit North and South, why not try
to facilitate the cyclical nature of migration by providing guest
workers visas that would enable legal crossings?
Under this scenario, several types of migrants are likely to
emerge. First, we might expect that some migrants' needs will be
served by a short sojourn in the United States, and for these migrants, a guest worker program would ensure that those sojourns
can be taken legally. Add to this possibility a world of relaxed
border enforcement, and such migrants become even more likely
to return home, with the expectation that later visa-less crossings might be feasible, should they become necessary.
Second, there will be some guest workers who will take full
advantage of the temporary visa system, which will necessarily
result in a long-term (though perhaps not lifelong) stay. The reason is that for a guest worker program to be minimally effective
at reducing undocumented immigration, it must permit migrants
to work for a number years, it must include the possibility of visa
renewal, and it should permit workers to bring their spouses and
dependents, who are otherwise likely to attempt to cross the bor-
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der as time passes to reunite with the breadwinner who made
the initial crossing. Employers also will want some stability in
their workforces. Many workers will apply for as many visa cycles as are made available, and many will bring spouses and dependents with them, which is also likely to extend the length of
time guest workers remain in the United States, because the imperative of family reunification in the country of origin will no
longer exist.
Assuming that migrants who take advantage of the full extent of the adopted guest worker program still opt to return
home after two visa cycles-say six years-they will still have
been in the U.S. for a long period. As brief sojourns turn into
years, the importance of incorporating these migrants into the
body politic rises. The longer the semi-permanent presence, the
more likely it is that these migrants will form interests whose
defense requires access to social support networks and political
processes. Moreover, the more time passes, the more migrants'
interests become intertwined with communities of lawful permanent residents and U.S. citizens. As Douglas Massey has shown,
as migrants "make repeated trips and accumulate more time
abroad," as they are joined by spouses and children in the workforce, and as they forge stronger links with particular employers,
"a growing number of migrants and families settle in the host
society." 110 The longer a guest worker's presence in the United
States, the greater the possibility that U.S. citizen children will
enter the picture, cementing permanent ties to the United
States. Guest worker programs, even by their own temporary
terms, are likely to create semi-permanent members.
Given this very real possibility, we want to provide immigrant workers with an incentive to invest in the society around
them, even if their ultimate objective is to return home. All parties involved have an interest in ostensibly temporary workers
behaving as good and effective social actors, even if their integration remains incomplete. No one has an interest in creating isolated cohorts with minimal connection to or investment in a
world beyond their own personal interests. Preventing immigrant isolation requires psychological as well as resource-based
investment by migrants in the institutions and customs of the
receiving society-precisely the sort of investment that makes
being an immigrant less of a challenge for migrants themselves.
110 See Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 99 Am J Sociol at 1502 (cited in note 21).
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To create the incentives for this level of regard, the society in
which migrants are temporarily present must also be one in
which they can meaningfully participate. Individuals will be better social actors if they are both given the option of a permanent
stake in society and expected to show the level of concern or regard for the well being of the receiving society that we should
expect of full members. As Adam Cox and Eric Posner note in
their discussion of the concept of country-specific investment, the
uncertainty caused by immigration policies, such as guest worker
programs that treat immigrants as if they were on probation,
delay an immigrant's investment in society.'1 1 Again, this may be
precisely the motivation behind guest worker programs, but the
result will be the presence for prolonged periods of time of isolated immigrant cohorts. Like Cox and Posner, my view is that
"[a]ll else equal, it is generally better if the immigrant makes a
112
country-specific investment than if she does not."
Even for the migrants whose relocation interests remain
temporary, then, our policies should be focused on creating incentives for social investment. At this stage, it is worth underscoring the instability of the so-called transnational lifestyle. It
may be that increasing numbers of migrants are forging a way of
life that involves movement from society to society and maintenance of allegiances across borders. 1 3 But even those with
transnational lives maintain presences in actual communities for
extended periods of time, and the importance of having an anchor in those communities, whether it be in the form of citizenship or self-created social networks, should not be discounted.
One way to facilitate the development of the ties that anchor
111 See Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration
Law, 59 Stan L Rev 809, 827-29 (2007).
112 Id at 828. As Cox and Posner use it, the concept of country-specific investment has
a very particular meaning; it involves investment in skills or relationships that are not
transferable outside the U.S. Id at 828. Learning English, therefore, would not be a country-specific investment, given the prevalence of the language around the world. But as
Hiroshi Motomura points out, this concept of country specific investment may be too
narrow. "[I]mmigrants who face ex post screening will feel less attached to and accepted
by the host country, and immigrants will feel more attached and accepted where ex ante
screening is the norm. These effects have little to do with whether an investment is country specific." Motomura, 59 Stan L Rev at 864 (cited in note 26). The key issue, ultimately, is whether a given immigration policy gives immigrants the incentive to become
attached to and learn about American society. Programs that provide no right to remain,
or no security with respect to long-term prospects, are less like to accomplish this objective.
113 For various discussions of this development, consider Peggy Levitt and Mary C.
Waters, eds, The Changing Face of Home: The TransnationalLives of the Second Generation (Russell Sage 2002).
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even the highly mobile migrant would be to present migrants
with the possibility of permanent membership, or with the security that the United States is a society to which they can belong.
Designing visa policy in this way may lead more immigrants to
form a permanent intent to remain. But a policy that accepts this
possibility upfront and attempts to prevent the specter of a detached and isolated laboring class from arising is far preferable
to a policy that encourages the creation and perpetuation of a
laboring class with a minimal stake in the long-term prosperity
of the society in which it labors.
2. Temporary migrants with permanent intent.
Whether migrants set out with the intent to relocate permanently, many migrants develop the intent to remain in the
United States. Again, guest worker programs are arguably designed to prevent this sort of intent from forming, but in trying
to prevent the inevitable and the predictable, such programs are
destined for long-term policy failure. While it is difficult to determine what percentage of temporary migrants will inevitably
form this permanent intent, ensuring that immigrant incorporation is successful demands that we take into account the fact that
despite the initial temporary intentions of most migrants, intentions can and do change.
As David Martin has pointed out, Mexico's assurances that
Mexican migration is largely circular and the accompanying polling data of migrants demonstrating their temporary intent may
well be misleading, particularly given the historical track record
of guest worker programs. 114 Despite the fact that migration always has been cyclical or transnational in nature, 1 5 sizeable
populations of immigrants made up of people who initially possessed temporary intent nonetheless consistently have maintained a semi-permanent or permanent residence in the United
States. Guest worker programs have remained temporary only
when accompanied with harsh enforcement measures. As Europe
discovered in the 1970s, workers who migrate initially with temporary intent often end up "sink[ing] roots" into their host soci114 See David A. Martin, What Lures Them Here: Changes to Immigration Law Should
Focus Less on the Border and More on the Job, Legal Times 58 (May 29, 2006).
115 Consider Foner and Alba, The Second Generation from the Last Great Wave of

Immigration (cited in note 41). As Nancy Foner has emphasized, transnationalism is not
a new phenomenon, though it is more viable among the second generation today than at
the turn of the twentieth century.
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ety, because workers "aren't just cogs in an economic machine,"
but human beings.1 16 To think that guest worker programs will
now succeed in channeling temporary migration and curbing illegal immigration, despite past failures, because of a new transnational or circular Zeitgeist is ultimately misguided. Indeed,
millions of migrants build their lives inside the United States,
despite the fact that they have no legal right to do so.
The reasons migrants develop permanent intent are various
and can be summed up by the oft-quoted statement of Swiss
117
writer Max Frisch: "We asked for workers and people came."
Return migration thus can be difficult to secure." 8 Some migrants find that the differential between what they earn in the
United States and what they would be earning at home is too
great to give up, and this encourages them to transform brief
stays into longer periods of presence. 119 Through the development of social networks and the formation of new family ties
through LPR or citizen spouses and U.S.-born children, a temporary foray to the United States becomes a life in the United
States.
Migration flows also tend to be self-perpetuating. What begins on the part of guest workers as a desire for economic advancement, or the desire to take advantage of opportunities to
support a family or fund a project back home, gives way to a
longer-term interest in reaping the advantages of life in the
United States, which in turn creates the impulse toward reunifi116 Id. See also Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch, Managing Labor Migration at 93 (cited
in note 92) (noting that "rotation and return rules" in guest worker programs are difficult
to implement while protecting the human rights of migrants).
117 Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch, Managing Labor Migration at 93 (cited in note 92).
118 See David Abraham, American Jobs but Not the American Dream, NY Times A19
(Jan 9, 2004) ("[E]xperience shows that guest workers are not good guests: they rarely
want to leave. In Germany today there are more than two million people of Muslim Turkish origin, many of whose families came as guest workers four decades ago."). For a discussion of this phenomenon in the European context, see Cindy Hahamovitch, Creating
Perfect Immigrants: Guestworkers of the World in Historical Perspective, 44 Labor Hist
69, 88 (2003) ("Guestworker programs led to higher rates of unauthorized migration
whether or not they cycled workers out of the country at the end of each season or year
because the guest workers who stayed on-with or without state sanction-often sent for
relatives and friends once they were established. Workers forced to leave at the end of
their contracts often returned illegally to employers who were quite willing to rehire them
and thus save the expense of complying with the terms of their government's temporary
worker program.").
119 See Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmes at 15 (cited in note 11) (noting
that many migrant workers "simply abandon their original plans of returning home and
prefer to remain in the host country instead," and that "failure to achieve savings targets,
often due to lower than expected income, may force foreign workers to stay and work in
the country much longer than initially intended").
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cation with extended family and friends who remained behind
when the guest worker first crossed the border. 120 What is more,
those workers who do return home are more likely to return to
the United States illegally at a later date, perhaps because their
experience has taught them how to navigate the American labor
market and has given them an intimate awareness of the actual,
practical advantages of the wage differential between the United
States and Mexico, which would only have been an abstraction or
rumor before their guest worker experience.
In a similar vein, guest worker programs also lead to the
emergence of networks that encourage migration by others
through information sharing and by creating the social support
systems that make migration possible. 12 1 In this sense, guest
worker programs facilitate illegal visa overstays as well as the
unauthorized migration of foreign workers who cannot fulfill the
criteria of the guest worker program, either because they cannot
find a sponsoring employer, they have failed the screening requirements of the program, or because annual quotas have been
met. Guest worker programs thus create a ready community into
which illegal workers can integrate for their survival.
3. Temporary programs and the threat to mobility.
Guest worker programs conceived as truly temporary programs ignore the inevitability of changed intent and thus
threaten to undermine integrationist goals in three ways. First,
by creating an irreconcilable conflict between compliance with
the law and long-term intent as described above, a guest worker
program would give rise to new forms of illegality, which would
undermine the incorporation of immigrants as a general matter.
This illegality will arise not only because migrants unable to secure visas will follow the networks that guest worker programs
create, but also because many guest workers who run afoul of the
requirements of their visas will remain behind. 122 The more intricate the bureaucratic maze, the harder compliance will be and
the more likely it will be that a new undocumented population
will arise, despite attempts to create a new legal status. Tying a
visa to a particular employer, limiting the amount of time a
worker has to find a new sponsoring employer if he or she loses
120 Consider Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 99 Am J Sociol (cited in note 21).
121 See id.

122 See Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmesat 20-21 (cited in note 11).
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his or her job, permitting guest workers to find jobs only in certain sectors of the economy (namely where sufficient native
workers cannot be found), limiting the number of times a worker
can renew his visa, requiring that a guest worker return home
for a year before applying for lawful permanent residence (if that
option is available), and restricting the ability of spouses and
children to work all would create new incentives for illegal immigration or visa overstay. Though worker visas must come with
requirements attached, the possibility of illegality should be
123
taken into consideration when setting those requirements.
Second, temporary worker programs prevent immigrants
from taking advantage of opportunities in the economy and thus
compound immigrant isolation 124 and delay integration. To the
extent that guest worker visas tie migrants to particular employers at the initial stage of entry or prevent migrants who lose
their jobs or wish to work elsewhere from seeking alternative
employment, they present particular threats to mobility. Such
restrictions not only make it difficult for migrants to respond to
shifts in the labor market, but they also make the immigrant
uniquely vulnerable to the interests of the sponsoring employer.
But even a guest worker program that includes portability as a
feature of the visa is still likely to lead to immigrant isolation in
sectors of the economy, because even a portability regime would
limit participation to industries that can demonstrate need for
immigrant labor-industries such as meat packing, construction,
domestic work, and agriculture. 125 Whether these limitations are
123 This same caution should guide attempts to devise legalization programs for the
undocumented population currently residing in the United States. The more obstacles or
criteria Congress creates for the current undocumented population to overcome before
attaining legal status, the less successful a legalization program will be in resolving the
undocumented problem.
124 See Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmes at 10 (cited in note 11):
On the one hand, a segmented labour market and the existence of what is often
perceived as "undesirable work" in "undesirable sectors", which natives no
longer wish to take up, have constituted major reasons for the inflow and concentrated employment of foreign workers in these sectors. On the other hand,
restrictions of the employment of foreign workers to certain sectors and/or occupations of the host economy has led, or at least contributed, to the desertion of
these sectors/occupations by native workers, thus giving rise to, or at least exacerbating, the (further) segmentation of the labour market and the emergence
of immigrant sectors.
Id. See also Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch, ManagingLabor Migration at 86 (cited in note
92) (noting that 'immigrant sectors" in the host economy emerge in the face of temporary
worker programs, which increases the economy's need for migrants and which can lead to
exploitation in recruitment and employment of workers).
125 One potential antidote to this problem is suggested by an immigration reform
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justified as forms of protecting the interests of U.S.-born and
LPR workers, the result of such limitations is that employers in
these industries become dependent on immigrant labor, 126 and
immigrants remain concentrated in these industries.
In addition to the obvious restraints this concentration exerts on upward economic mobility, this isolation also makes the
cultural and socio-political forms of assimilation more difficult to
navigate. For migrants whose intents change, the strictures on
their mobility outlined above become not just disincentives to
invest in their temporary communities, but also serious obstacles
to their longer-term social advancement, thus delaying their assimilation. As I discuss in more detail in the next section, the
emergence of immigrant sectors contributes to "social exclusion"
by separating immigrant workers from native workers and into
identifiable classes. 127 Furthermore, because immigrant sectors
of the economy are often characterized by low wages and poor
working conditions, 128 their perpetuation helps fuel the sentiment that immigrant workers are willing to work in substandard
conditions, whereas Americans are not. This contributes to the
perception that immigrants as "cheap labor" are taking the jobs
of American workers, thus fueling opposition to immigration
generally.
Third, guest worker programs do not provide a stable basis
for broader or more challenging forms of integration, because
they do not guarantee the critical right to remain. Students of
immigration and alienage law quickly come to realize that the
most valuable right of citizenship may not be the right to vote or
otherwise participate in the political process, but rather the right
to continued and permanent presence in the society one calls
home. The right to remain is the precursor to all other forms of
about to be introduced in Singapore, a country that has long relied on guest workers to
fulfill its demanding labor needs and that is also facing a population crisis. According to a
recent report by the Migration Information Source, Singapore is implementing a "new
category of flexible, 'personalized' employment passes tied to the person rather than the
employer," which would allow the foreign worker to change jobs or stay in Singapore even
after leaving his or her initial employer. See Brenda S.A. Yeoh, Singapore: Hungry for
Foreign Workers at All Skill Levels (Migration Information Source Jan 2007), available at
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=570> (last visited Jan 20,
2007).
126 See Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmes at 11-12 (cited in note 11)
(noting how sectors targeted for temporary labor "are often afflicted by lowered wages
and deteriorating working conditions," eventually developing a "structural demand" for
foreign workers and thus suffering from permanent shortages of native workers).
127 See id at 12.

128 See id at 11-12.
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participation. Mobility depends on the foundational security that
permanent presence provides. There must, of course, be some
sort of transition period before immigrants can become citizens,
but the difference between an LPR and a temporary guest
worker is that a legal commitment has been made to the former
and not the latter; the former is presumptively entitled to per129
manent presence, whereas the latter is not.
The absence of a commitment, or the uncertainty of one's
status, diminishes incentives critical to successful assimilationincentives to learn English and to integrate into larger social
networks. A guest worker visa gives immigrants no clear signals
with respect to their place in society, other than as workers. The
risk of stepping outside communities of co-ethnics is great. But
without taking these risks, the social capital needed to negotiate
a new and diverse society becomes hard to develop. The right to
remain provides a form of social insurance that makes these
risks more manageable.
The policy failures common to many of the guest worker programs that have been adopted around the world in the recent
past provide powerful evidence of these various threats to mobility. Studies of guest worker programs adopted in other societies
underscore that the consequences of adoption are fairly predictable. As Philip Martin, Manola Abella, and Christiane Kuptsch
have shown, guest worker programs grow far larger and last
much longer than originally intended. 130 Employers become de129 Of course, the security of LPR status today is not what it once was. The dramatic
expansion of the definition of aggravated felony alone, among the many highly restrictive
changes of the 1996 immigration reforms, has made LPR status a precarious one. The
central contention of this Article-that immigration policy should attempt to facilitate the
integration of immigrants-would also demand a reform of many of the measures adopted
in 1996. For a critique of our legal system's current conceptualization of lawful permanent residence, see generally Motomura, Americans in Waiting (cited in note 90). I discuss the important ideas Motomura advances in his book in more detail in Part II B.
130 See Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch, Managing Labor Migration at 85 (cited in note
92) (noting that guest worker programs tend to become larger than originally planned
and last longer than originally intended because of the phenomena of "distortion" and
"dependence," distortion referring to the fact that once businesses make investments that
assume that migrants will continue to come to the United States, they will resist changes
to policies that curb the influx of foreign workers, and dependence referring to the fact
that migrants, families, communities, and governments of sending societies become dependent on the earnings of guest workers and thus resist policy changes as well). See also
Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmesat 6 (cited in note 11) (analyzing the consequences of major temporary foreign worker programs adopted by six different societies
in the recent past). Ruhs also documents the "bloating" that has occurred, or the "unforeseen prolongation ... and the initially unanticipated increases in the legal admission of
foreign workers." Id at 15-17. See also Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. 141 (Routledge 1992) (noting that in the 1950s, the
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pendent on foreign workers and prove reluctant to see guest
worker programs come to an end. What is promised as a limited
solution to a temporary economic need often becomes an unwieldy program with an administrative and institutional life of
its own. Guest worker programs create expectations and dependencies that cause them to be self-perpetuating and beyond the
political control of policymakers.
The consequences of this expansion are evident in our own
historical experience 1 3 ' with guest worker programs, which highlights how counterproductive they can be if their purpose is to
prevent undocumented populations from arising, and if the assimilation of immigrants is our long-term goal. As Mae Ngai has
demonstrated in vivid detail in her history of undocumented immigration, the infamous Bracero program, initially adopted to
address labor shortages in the agricultural sector in the Southwest during World War II, resulted in what she terms an "imported colonialism"'1 2 unworthy of a liberal democracy. 133 During
average number of braceros entering the United States each year was ten times higher
than the number admitted during the wartime program of 1942-1947 when a labor emergency had been declared).
131 In her important study of the Bracero program, Kitty Calavita demonstrates that,
despite its initial conception in 1942 as a response to wartime labor shortages in the
agricultural sector, the Bracero programs lasted until 1964, fueled both by Southwestern
growers' evolving dependence on the imported labor, as well as by the INS's own institutional and bureaucratic interests in keeping the program going. See Calavita, Inside the
State at 2-4 (cited in note 130). As Calavita points out, the program was created in 1942
through administrative design by the INS and the Departments of State, Labor, and
Agriculture and through a bilateral agreement with Mexico. Id at 2. Congress initially
authorized the program, but in 1947, with the original justification for the program gone
because of the end of the war, Congress permitted the statutory authorization of the
program to expire. Id. For almost twenty years, however, administrative action led by the
INS sustained the program. Id.
132 Ngai, Impossible Subjects at 128-29 (cited in note 14). Ngai argues that this colonialism, a legacy of the U.S. conquest of northern Mexico in the nineteenth century, arose
as the result of U.S. immigration policies. Id. These policies created a "racialized, transnational workforce comprising various legal status categories across the U.S.-Mexico
boundary-Mexican Americans, legal immigrants, undocumented migrants, and imported
contract workers (braceros)-but which, as a whole, remained external to conventional
definitions of the American working class and national body." Id.
133 The key features of the Bracero program included a stipulation that Mexican
workers would not be used to replace domestic workers or be permitted to depress wages
in the agricultural sector; guarantees to the braceros of transportation, housing, food, and
repatriation, as well as an exemption from U.S. military service; the setting of wages at
the prevailing rate in the domestic market; and an agreement that braceros would not be
subject to discrimination, such as exclusion from "white" areas of segregated public accommodations. Id at 139-40. In addition to the Bracero program, other contract labor
programs operated in the mid-twentieth century in the United States as well. Workers
from the British West Indies migrated to the Southeast to perform farm labor, and Puerto
Ricans, though citizens, performed seasonal agricultural work in the Northeast, under
the auspices of the Puerto Rican government. See id at 138.
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the Bracero era, which lasted until the mid-1960s, indicia of exploitation and immigrant isolation were rampant, such as violations of contract terms, including protections for the wages and
jobs of native workers and poor working conditions. 134 Over time,
Mexico lost its ability to control the terms of the program, 135 a
control it had originally negotiated to protect its citizens, and a
form of control it seeks today. What is more, because many more
people wanted to enter the United States than were legally permitted, the program contributed to the emergence of a new, illegal population, 36 an explosion that the INS itself took advantage
of and perpetuated. 137 Indeed, commentators describe the emergence of a large undocumented population as one of the primary
13 8
legacies of the Bracero experiment.
As a result of this experiment, the non-Hispanic population
of the Southwest readily conflated illegal immigrants with legal
immigrants and Mexican-American citizens of the United
States. 39 The emergence of new forms of illegality not only compromised public support for immigration generally, but also poisoned already encumbered race relations among citizens of the
United States. The racial dynamics introduced by the Bracero
program created tensions within the Mexican-American commu134 See Ngai, Impossible Subjects at 143-44 (cited in note 14).
135 See id at 146 (noting that by giving up its right to unilaterally blackball an employer or county, Mexico "lost the only practical leverage it had over the determination of
wages and the treatment of braceros," and that by agreeing to a policy of recontracting
braceros at the border, Mexico effectively lost "whatever ability [it] had to control the
process of emigration").
136 See id at 147-48, 155-58 (noting that despite a massive enforcement effort known
as "Operation Wetback," illegal migration continued, partly as the result of border recruitment of workers and INS policies intended to rechannel illegal migration into legal
migration).
137 Kitty Calavita observes that:
To accommodate employers who complained that recruiting braceros from Mexico was expensive and time-consuming, the INS devised an even simpler arrangement: on-the-spot legalization of illegal Mexican farm workers. Indeed,
the official policy during this period gave priority to illegal immigrants found in
the United States. By 1950, the number of Mexicans 'legalized" and "paroled" to
growers as braceros was five times higher than the number actually recruited
from Mexico.
Calavita, Inside the State at 2 (cited in note 130). Calavita argues that such INS policies
were not simply the result of the power of the "capitalist class," or the growers, but that
they arose as result of the INS's own institutional and bureaucratic needs, which often
put the INS at odds with the Department of Labor during the decades-long
(mis)management of the Bracero program. See id at 4.
138 See, for example, Philip L. Martin and Michael S. Teitelbaum, The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers, 80 Foreign Aff 117, 123 (2001).
139 See Ngai, Impossible Subjects at 149 (cited in note 14).
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nity as well, which resented being associated with the braceros
and illegal migrants, but which also was connected to those same
people through common membership in a transnational community and was thus affected by the mistreatment and deportation
140
of the migrant workers of the period.
Given these events, the specter of the Bracero program may
be sufficient reason to reject the guest worker idea out of hand
because of its impact on the status of immigrants and Latinos in
the United States. Indeed, many of the same exploitative conditions have been documented recently by the Southern Poverty
Law Center as features of the limited guest worker programs
that persist today. The Center reports that temporary workers
who have entered the U.S. on the so-called H-2 visas' 4 ' are routinely denied their wages, exploited by labor brokers or employers who seize their documents, forced to live in substandard conditions, and denied medical benefits for on-the-job injuries. 142 In
other words, the passage of time and awareness of the pathologies of the Bracero era have not been sufficient to prevent similar
conditions from arising in the lives of today's guest workers.
4. Integrating guest workers through institutional design.
Of course, though the problematic conditions of the Bracero
experience still obtain, it might be possible to learn from past
mistakes and avoid the common pitfalls of guest worker programs through innovations in institutional design. The policy
panacea proposed at various stages of the debate to prevent some
of the dysfunctions outlined above is a guest worker program
that culminates in an earned path to permanent residence or
citizenship. From the United States' perspective, such a solution
might seem ideal. Workers come to the U.S. on a probationary
basis, and only those with the wherewithal to comply with the
strictures of the temporary program, who prove themselves able
140 See id at 158-60.
141 The H-2 program was originally launched in 1943 and enabled Florida sugar cane
growers to import workers from the Caribbean. The program was revived in 1986, when
Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act. In 2005, approximately 32,000
H-2A, or non-agricultural visas, were issued, and approximately 89,000 H-2B, or agricultural visas, were issued. The vast majority of these temporary workers come from Mexico,
Jamaica, and Guatemala, with approximately three-quarters of workers coming from
Mexico. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Close to Slavery: GuestworkerPrograms in the
United States 5 (2007). For an in-depth study of these programs, see David Griffith,
American Guestworkers: Jamaicans and Mexicans in the US Labor Market (Penn State
2006).
142 See Close to Slavery at 2 (cited in note 141).
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to meet certain selection criteria, are considered for permanent
143
residence.
A temporary visa that comes with the possibility of adjustment of status in the future would certainly be consistent with
the trends in immigration law discussed above. A large share of
the so-called nonimmigrant (in other words, temporary) visas
allocated by Congress for workers at all levels of the employment
ladder have become "de facto transitional visas,"144 making temporary migration a standard path to permanent resettlement.
And it should go without saying that no provisional worker program adopted should be without a path to permanent residence.
But the possibility of adjustment may not be sufficient to
stave off the consequences of a guest worker program I have just
outlined. Adjustment of status as it is permitted today occurs
under highly restrictive circumstances involving heavy paper
work, complex legal machinations, and high fees. 14 5 What is
more, forming the intent to remain while on a nonimmigrant visa
can be grounds for removal. 146 The adjustment process could, of
course, be streamlined, but the need to adjust creates yet another
significant bureaucratic hurdle for the immigrant to cross. The
fact that our immigration laws have evolved in this way, probably as the result of inertia rather than consideration of the desirability of this trend, should not be a sufficient reason for replicating a pattern likely to exacerbate the current undocumented crisis, given that the guest worker program is meant to address an
immigrant stream apparently quite willing to circumvent legal
requirements.
The success of such promises of adjustment in accommodating those who form the intent to remain also depends in large
143 See generally Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev 809 (cited in note 111) (describing
how an immigration system might be designed to gather information about potential
permanent residents by admitting them with few screening mechanisms and considering
their desirability after a period spent in the United States).
144 See Marc R. Rosenblum, "Comprehensive" Legislation vs. Fundamental Reform:
The Limits of Current Immigration Proposals 9 (Migration Policy Institute Jan 2006),
available at <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/PolicyBriefl3_JanO6_l3.pdf>
(last
visited Jan 20, 2007). See also Deborah Waller Meyers, Temporary Worker Programs:A
Patchwork Policy Response 11 (Migration Policy Institute January 2006), available at
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TFI 12 Meyers.pdf> (last visited Jan 20, 2007)
(explaining that a significant portion of temporary workers just adjust to lawful permanent status, demonstrating that "[f]or many employers and workers [the temporary
worker system] is acting as a transition to permanent employment").
145 See Rosenblum, "Comprehensive"Legislation at 9 (cited in note 144).
146 Id. Rosenblum concludes that "the nonimmigrant labor migration system lacks
transparency, is highly inefficient, and in many cases undermines the rule of law." Id.
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part on the other features of the visa program. In debating this
alternative, it is important to consider whether the other requirements of the program are too strict: Do the constraints of
the temporary programs make it unlikely that many migrants
with permanent intent will ultimately make it to the adjustment
phase? Is the requirement that workers who lose or leave their
jobs find employment with another certified employer-a requirement not imposed on lawful permanent residents, who have
complete freedom of movement in the economy-an overly burdensome constraint, or a constraint that keeps immigrants
locked in certain sectors of the economy?
Finally, even guest worker programs that promise a path to
permanent status at some future date give rise to uncertainty
with respect to the migrants' future presence in the United
States, thus setting up the wrong incentives. 147 Again, freedom of
movement and taking risks, such as leaving the security (or isolation) of one's community of co-ethnics, depend on the security
of the right to remain. A visa that leaves the immigrant's longterm status undefined does not promote investment by the immigrant in the society around him. And even if the immigrant is
willing to invest, the guest worker formulation nonetheless undermines social reciprocity, which ultimately stands as an independent obstacle to integration, and which I consider in more
detail in the final section of this Article.
One obvious alternative to a guest worker program with a
path to earned citizenship would be to increase dramatically the
number of LPR visas available to unskilled workers. After all,
the current admission system permits the allocation of only 5,000
per year. 148 An LPR visa represents a much stronger form of precommitment than a guest worker visa with a hypothetical possibility of adjustment of status and immediately encourages its
bearer to invest in becoming American.
The problem, of course, is that the current system of LPR
admissions, particularly with respect to the family preference
categories, is beset by backlogs, and the processing of permanent
visas is a cumbersome process, at least as currently designed.
Furthermore, the responsibility attached to holding an LPR visa
may be more than some migrants initially want to take on. The
147 For reasons I explain in more detail in the next Part, for these types of migrantscall them semi-permanent migrants-guest worker programs present more of an obstacle
to their integration because of the ways in which they undermine reciprocity.
148 See note 81.
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puzzle thus becomes how to facilitate temporary migration for
those whose cyclical intent remains, while simultaneously ensuring that the migrants who decide to remain do not become
unlawful once they have exceeded the time limits of the guest
worker program. Can we devise a visa or set of visas that makes
a commitment to permanent membership, but that also enables
immigrants to return home, if that is what they prefer?
As a policy matter, perhaps the best strategy would be to
open up two separate paths. As a complement to increasing the
number of permanent visas for unskilled workers-a long term
strategy that will require deep reforms in the admissions bureaucracy-we might create a provisional visa that enables the
quick entry of enough workers to meet current labor market
needs, 149 but that also carries a presumption of adjustment at the
end of a relatively short period of time-perhaps at the end of a
single visa period. The critical design issues will involve how
easy it is to adjust status, whether self-petitioning is permissible,
whether there will be quotas on the number of provisional workers who can adjust status, and what exactly it means for there to
be a presumption in favor of adjustment. Though these details
are beyond the scope of this Article, the crucial point to keep in
mind is that any policy adopted with a view to curbing undocumented immigration and assuring future integration must focus
on the inevitability of the temporary migrant with permanent
intent.
B.

Guest Worker Programs and the Threat to Reciprocity

Even if we assume, despite all evidence to the contrary, that
a guest worker program is the solution to the crisis of unauthorized immigration, the initial reciprocity gains achieved through
the neutralization of the illegality problem are likely to be offset
by the longer-term impact of creating a new temporary immigration status. Moreover, even if some combination of temporary
visas with the possibility of adjustment and a meaningful increase in the number of available LPR visas for unskilled workers were sufficient to secure optimal immigrant mobility, addressing the inevitable future demand for entry into the United
States by promising Americans a temporary guest worker pro149 For a proposal of this type, see Abraham, et al, Immigration and America's Future
at 36 (cited in note 7) (proposing to dramatically simplify the current visa system by
creating provisional visas, which would apply across all employment categories, including
the unskilled).
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gram will still threaten to undermine the reciprocity required for
assimilation. Guest worker policies simply promise Americans
too much and ask of them too little.
1. Policy failures and the threat of backlash.
In proposing a guest worker program as a prospective solution to the problem of unlawful migration, policymakers emphasize that the current undocumented population highlights the
American economy's need for foreign workers in certain key sectors. As I noted at the outset of this Article, guest worker programs therefore promise Americans two things: a means of securing essential labor in a way that will not dislocate the American worker, and a policy fix that will prevent the emergence of
future undocumented immigration without opening the door to
permanent immigrant resettlement.
But given the preceding discussion, it seems clear that these
promises are unlikely to be met. When a program billed simultaneously as a solution to illegal immigration and a means of serving temporary economic demands results in the reemergence of
either unauthorized immigration or the apparent resettlement of
migrants and their families, the public is likely to conclude that
the government has lost control and thus demand that the program be abandoned altogether-a major reason the Bracero program eventually came to an end. 150 As was the case during the
Bracero era, the rise of illegality, along with general concern over
working conditions and the saddling of the American worker
with unfair competition, helps generate resentment of immigration that is often expressed as resentment of illegal migration
specifically but also reflects eroded support for immigration more
generally. This erosion ultimately threatens the reciprocity required for the absorption of immigrants into the fabric of American life.
The harm of a temporary guest worker policy will, however,
include more than potential social backlash. The guest worker
solution, in and of itself and regardless of its consequences, fails
to promote the necessary reciprocal social adaptation in at least
three ways. First, either because Americans believe guest workers will not be or are not supposed to be repeat players, they are
given little incentive to incorporate immigrants into their
150 See Ngai, Impossible Subjects at 161-66 (cited in note 14) (discussing the variety of
factors that led to the end of the Bracero program, including pressure from labor unions
and civil rights activists, as well as heightened public awareness).
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neighborhoods, friendship networks, civic and religious associations, and other forms of organization. Second, guest worker programs do not prepare Americans to consider immigrant laborers
as actors with legitimate political status, who are entitled to demand action on their behalf by government, or demand recognition of their voice in public conversations about matters that affect the course of their lives in the United States. Finally, guest
worker policies reinforce the perception that immigrants bring
with them foreign cultures, as opposed to cultural identities that
must in some way be integrated into conceptions of American
culture. In other words, the guest worker formulation ensures
that the forms of cultural distinctiveness-linguistic and otherwise-that immigration inevitably introduces into the receiving
society will not be normalized, but instead will continue to be
thought of as foreign.
Of course, the idea of the guest worker may on one level lead
to greater acceptance of cultural distinctiveness. After all, if the
worker's presence is temporary, there is no need for him to adapt
to the surrounding culture in the United States. This form of acceptance might even translate into greater tolerance of nonEnglish-speaking children in the public schools and a corresponding willingness to support forms of instruction that emphasize the language, history, and culture of Mexico and the rest of
Latin America-forms of instruction less likely to be tolerated for
immigrants on the path to permanent residence.
Yet the obligations the United States might have as the host
of temporary workers, particularly to the spouses and children of
those workers, have scarcely been addressed in the public debate. And the cultural reciprocity required for immigrant assimilation to succeed is not acceptance of the presence of foreign cultures in the American midst, but rather a tolerance for the hybrid forms of cultural identity that assimilation produces, as well
as acceptance of a public sphere that includes other languages,
celebrations, forms of recreation, and forms of social organization.
In the end, guest worker programs offer an ad hoc solution
to a persistent problem. As a policy solution, they leave for a
later date a reality Americans must confront. Instead of devising
technocratic quick fixes to the crisis that is pushing policymakers
to address immigration in the first place, Congress and the
American people should come to terms with the reality of the
interdependence of the United States and Mexico and with the
reality that Americans and Mexicans, and to a lesser extent
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other Latin Americans, are in an important sense part of the
same society, which for the foreseeable future means the permanent presence of migrants within our borders.
2. Guest worker programs as a failure of reciprocal obligation.
For a variety of compelling reasons, political theorists have
criticized the concept of the guest worker as inconsistent with
liberal values. Michael Walzer's rejection of the guest worker
formulation in his analysis of immigration in Spheres of Justice
remains a touchstone for theoretical reflection on such proposals
and is therefore worth considering in some detail. Walzer begins
from the premise that membership is the primary good we distribute to one another, serving, as it does, as the individual's
guarantee of security, welfare, and protection from the vicissitudes of the market. 151 Existing members of a political community have a right to distribute membership, thereby shaping
their population. 152 This distribution is subject only to the limitations imposed by the meaning existing members give to the concept of membership and the duties of mutual aid we owe to
strangers.153
But, as Walzer emphasizes, though a state has a right to
control whom it admits, every immigrant admitted should be a
potential citizen. He writes, "members must be prepared to accept, as their own equals in a world of shared obligation, the men
and women they admit." 154 In return, "immigrants must be prepared to share the obligation."'' 55 This relationship is, in a sense,
one of perfect reciprocity.
On the face of things, guest worker programs might seem to
promote reciprocity. The receiving society has engineered for itself and the guest worker an apparent bargain. Workers send
money home they otherwise would not have had, and the receiving society saves as well. Though the receiving society loses
something in the form of the remittances sent elsewhere and
must, under some programs, spend to provide housing for their
new guests, these costs are probably lower than the investment
that would have been required had the migrants come in as fu151 See Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 31-32 (cited in note 17).
152 Id at 52.
153 Id.
154 Id.

155 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 52 (cited in note 17).
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ture citizens. The lost remittances are also probably less than the
cost of shaking up the domestic labor market and existing labor
law consensus to channel citizen workers into the jobs that guest
156
workers would otherwise fill.
But the bargain is only short term, and its success is contingent. The employer ends up in the most favorable position, because his labor needs have been met. The guest worker is also
better off than he would have been had he entered the country
illegally. But because migrants' intents change in ways they may
157
not foresee when they enter into the guest worker contract,
guest worker programs that are truly temporary ultimately force
migrants into an untenable choice: either to become unauthorized when their visas have expired or compromise the economic,
social, and familial ties they have forged during their time as
guest workers and return home.
In addition to becoming a constraint on the guest worker
whose intent changes, the initial Pareto superior bargain also
imposes externalities on society. By creating a temporary laboring class without full participation rights, or even the prospect of
full participation rights, such programs introduce opportunities
for exploitation and inequalities into social, political, and economic relations that are unacceptable in a democratic society
that depends on the ongoing consent of its subjects and an absence of castes. 158 As a policy matter, given the predictable ex156 See id at 56-58. See also Chang, 78 Chi Kent L Rev at 314 (cited in note 74) ('The
empirical evidence indicates that immigrants are likely to make a positive contribution to
the public treasury through the taxes they pay during their working years and impose a
burden only if they remain in the United States for their retirement years and gain access to public benefits.").
157 See Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 99 Am J Sociol at 1497 (cited in note 21),
which states:
At the individual level, participation in a high-wage economy induces changes
in tastes and motivations that turn people away from target earning and toward persistent migration. Satisfaction of the wants that originally led to migration creates new wants. Access to high wages and the goods they buy creates
new standards of material well-being, and first-hand experience in an affluent
society raises expectations and creates new ambitions for upward mobility. As
migrants earn high wages and alter their consumption patterns, they adopt new
lifestyles and local economic pursuits become less attractive.
Id (citations omitted).
158 See Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 58-59 (cited in note 17). Note, the guest worker
programs Walzer critiques are those that bar workers from future citizenship. Those
admitted with the promise of future citizenship, according to Walzer, would temporarily
occupy the lower rungs of the economy but would benefit from welfare and union protections and could, through their initiative, outdo and therefore move past local workers. See
id at 56. Whether Walzer would accept a guest worker program that promises a path to
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ternalities, it is no answer to say that the guest worker willingly
entered into the temporary contract, which underscores the absence of true reciprocity in the guest worker arrangement. As
Walzer points out, guest workers are not truly guests, nor are
they like tourists. 159 In Walzer's analogy, guest worker programs
create live-in servants, hired to perform the tasks members of
the family eschew.160 They perform "socially necessary work" and
are immersed in and subject to the legal system of the society in
which they labor. 161 The treatment of guest workers should be
governed by principles of justice, which demand that the guest
worker have the choice about whether to remain or return
home. 162 But the power of the state looms tyrannically over guest
workers in the form of the constant threat of deportation, 163 and,
I would add, the threat of having to become an undocumented
immigrant if one cannot meet the terms of the guest worker visa.
This power is interrelated with and augments the power of the
employer, who holds the keys to the guest worker's right to remain and therefore acts with a form of authority over the worker
to which citizens and LPRs are not subject.
In his recent work calling for a reconceptualization of our
ideas of citizenship, Hiroshi Motomura articulates a vision of
permanent commitment to immigrants that has certain affinities
with Walzer's views on the importance of equal membership. Motomura calls for a revival of the concept of "Americans in waiting," or for treating immigrants not as strangers, as we largely
do today, 164 but as future citizens, as was the practice before
1952, the year Congress passed the major statute that now gov-

citizenship is unclear, though it would probably depend on how secure the law makes that
path. Walzer explicitly notes that the only acceptable conditions on naturalization are
time and "qualification," but he does not specify what legitimate qualifications would be.
Id at 60. What is more, despite the potential availability of adjustment, many of the same
conditions Walzer decries are likely to result from a guest worker program whether it
promises a path to citizenship or not, including the poor working conditions, and the
failure of the existing population to regard guest workers as fellow citizens. It seems
unlikely that the largely formal innovation of making adjustment of status available at
the end of a certain number of visa cycles will cure the problems that have characterized
most of the twentieth century's guest worker programs.
159 Id at 59.
160 Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 58-59 (cited in note 17).
161 Id at 60.
162 See id.

163 See id at 58-59. See also the discussion of the ways in which the various bureaucratic requirements of guest worker programs engender serious insecurities in the legal
status of the guest worker in Part II A 2.
164 See Motomura, Americans in Waiting at 9 (cited in note 90).

284

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2007:

erns all of immigration law. 165 According to this form of membership, immigrants would be entitled to treatment as essentially
full American citizens as they follow the path the law lays out to
full membership. 166 Under his proposal, lawful immigrants would
be permitted to sponsor their close relatives for admission in the
same ways as citizens, immigrants would be permitted to vote,
and immigrants would be eligible for the same public benefits as
citizens. 67 The idea of Americans-in-waiting presumably stems
from a belief, similar to Walzer's, that democracy is impoverished
when those who are governed by the law have no voice in its conception. 168 Motomura's perspective also suggests that, by making
an early commitment to the inclusion of immigrants into the polity, our law will not only make good on liberalism's promise of
equal treatment, but also will promote affection for the body politic and the American community among new arrivals by promising them full membership from the outset, thus promoting immigrant integration. 169
My conception of reciprocity has much in common with these
positions, based as it is on the idea that the incorporation of immigrants depends on the willingness of citizens and residents to
accept immigrants into their political and social institutions and
to giving immigrants security that will encourage their investment in American society. As I have made clear throughout, like
Motomura, I believe that the "we/they" lines we draw should be
based on the fact that many of the "them" will inevitably become
"us,"170 if not in the immigrant generation itself, certainly in the
second generation, by virtue of our birthright citizenship rule.

165 See id at 8. Motomura notes that, from 1795 to 1952, every applicant for naturalization was required to file a "declaration of intent" several years in advance, which in
turn elevated the immigrant to a unique pre-citizenship status. Id, citing Act of Jan 29,
1795, ch 20, § 1, 1 Stat 414, 414.
166 For earlier work exploring these themes, see Gerald Rosenberg, Aliens and Equal
Protection: Why not the Right to Vote, 75 Mich L Rev 1092 (1977) (arguing that lawful
permanent residents embody qualities that should make them full members of society);
and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, and the Constitution 7 Con
Comm 9 (1990) (arguing that lawful permanent residents should be thought of as members).
167 See id at 13.

16s See Motomura, Americans in Waiting at 151 (cited in note 90).
169 Compare Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 827-28 (cited in note 111) (noting that
"risk-averse noncitizens who do not know whether they will be retained may be reluctant
to come to the country and make country-specific investments," which are defined as
"investments whose return can be obtained only through continued residence in the country").
170 See Motomura, Americans in Waiting at 14 (cited in note 90).
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Motomura's conception of immigrants in transition goes a
step further than my own, as I have articulated it thus far, because it reveals the limitations of our current system of lawful
permanent residence, demonstrating that even the ostensibly
permanent admission system is not supported by a conception of
immigration that views immigrants as potentially permanent
members of our society. 171 Given the increasing insecurity of LPR
status, expanding the numbers of LPR visas available to unskilled workers may not, therefore, enable mobility and secure
reciprocity as broadly as I would advocate. The difference between LPR visas and guest worker visas may be of degree rather
than kind. Regardless, the degrees of differences between the two
are critical and worth emphasizing in the current debate, though
I would not foreclose a complete reorientation of the system governing the rights of LPRs to remain in the U.S. for the same reasons that I am wary of guest worker programs.
Though I share Walzer's skepticism about the compatibility
of guest worker programs and liberal democratic society, the core
of my critique of the guest worker program does not depend on
taking a communitarian point of view and emphasizing preservation of the tight-knit communities necessary to social bonding
and self-government, as Walzer's does. The idea of reciprocity, or
of mutual obligation as I present it, is built into liberal conceptions of society as a cooperative scheme that depends on a sense
of obligation to regard those with whom we associate as members
entitled to equal concern.
Not only does the idea of obligation stemming from association render guest worker programs problematic, it also calls into
question strict admissions decisions. In his discussion, Walzer
implies that the United States is justified in imposing restrictions on initial admissions as a way of avoiding the unseemly
results of a guest worker experiment; rather than embroil itself
in the creation of a mini-tyranny within a democratic society, the
171 Motomura identifies two other conceptions of immigration at work in our system:
"immigration as contract" and "immigration as affiliation." See id at 9-11. According to
immigration as contract, immigrants agree to abide by the law and are subject to deportation, basically under whatever terms the government decides are warranted. See id at 910. The elaborate maze of grounds of admissibility and deportability, the fact that courts
have no difficulty finding changes in the immigration law to apply retroactively, and the
fact that there are no external constitutional limits on Congress' power to establish
grounds of inadmissibility and deportability support this view. According to immigration
as affiliation, the treatment of immigrants should depend on the ties that they have inside the United States. See id at 10-11. The fact that the family preference categories
dominate the LPR admissions categories, as well as admissions more generally (through
the unlimited admission of spouses and children of U.S. citizens), reflects this view.

286

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2007:

wall precluding entrance altogether should remain high. But under current conditions in the U.S., we must extend the concept of
reciprocity to our admissions decisions. The pretense that we can
avoid internal inequalities by restricting immigration is not only
exposed as a pretense by the brute fact of undocumented immigration, it is also inconsistent with our behavior as a society.
In addition, as I have emphasized throughout this Article,
the communitarian's faith that restrictions on admissions at the
border will prevent the pathologies of a guest worker program
from arising is misplaced. The inevitability of current migration
means that if we do not adopt new forms of permanent membership, we will find ourselves either with a guest worker program
as a second-best option, or a compounded crisis of illegal immigration, which would be even worse. Walzer's world is simply not
achievable. To avoid these pitfalls, we must resist restrictionist
tendencies in our admissions policies and be open to shifts in the
permanent characteristics of our demography, creating rules of
membership that facilitate the acceptance of these changes.
Put slightly differently, the United States as a sovereign entity is not in complete control of its membership rules. Walzer
and other theorists who write about the legitimacy of restricting
immigration as if such complete control existed seem to ignore
this reality. 172 Walzer defines membership as "a social good constituted by our understanding," meaning that the current members of a society decide, through "work and conversation," to
which strangers or aliens to give the good of membership. 173 But
forces beyond the control of Congress-namely market and social
realities in the U.S. and Mexico-are creating new members of
American society in the form of undocumented migrants or
members without legal status. In other words, the distribution of
membership does not occur and is not occurring through a centralized entity; the centrally controlled naturalization process is
hardly the only means through which new members of American
society are being created. Congress is now behaving reactively
172 The idea of membership distribution is supported by a distinction between members and strangers that Walzer defends. The existence of this distinction means that
admissions decisions must be made by political communities, and it means that those
decisions are rarely criticized as a failure of distributive justice. Admissions decisions
may be criticized to the extent that they display a lack of charity-a criticism that reflects
the idea that we owe strangers a duty of mutual aid-but the scope of our obligations to
strangers, in Walzer's view, is clearly limited, and does not appear to require certain
types of admissions decisions over others. See Walzer, Spheres of Justice at 33-34 (cited
in note 17).
173 Id at 32.
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and is under great pressure to create new channels of membership through legalization and guest worker programs, channels
that might be very different from those we would establish in an
unconstrained world.
As I emphasized in Part I, the illegal migrants of today and
the guest workers of the future come to the United States as the
result of bidirectional forms of association, or because of hemispheric interconnectedness. Though this interconnectedness may
begin as a matter of economics, our economic choices result in
the creation of social networks that facilitate migration, even
once the economic incentives for migration fade174-networks of
which U.S. residents are as much the authors as the immigrants
themselves. The idea that obligations to others arise from our
association with them requires that we expand our conceptions of
political community. This observation does not mean that restrictions on admissions will not be appropriate in other contexts, but
with respect to the phenomenon that is the focus of this paper,
such restrictions must be limited.

We thus are faced with the need to adapt or find ways to absorb large-scale immigration. We can conceptualize this need in
two ways-as a matter of pragmatics and as a matter of obligation. Either way, whether Americans like it or not, the social
conditions that are generating the current wave of immigration
are producing a population of semi-permanent and permanent
settlers. Our commitment to certain political principles-to living in a liberal democracy without castes-as well as to a desire
to live in social peace, require that we incorporate these immigrants into mainstream social and political institutions. But by
characterizing immigrants as temporary sojourners, the very
idea of a guest worker program frames immigration as a temporary solution to the needs of Americans, as opposed to a social
condition to which Americans must adapt.
CONCLUSION

I began from the premise that guest worker programs represent a prospective solution to undocumented immigration. In
that sense, these programs offer a productive approach to contemplating the current immigration phenomenon and an essen174 See Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America at 17 (cited in note 21).
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tial policy complement to proposals for stricter enforcement at
the border and in the interior. It is difficult to specify how much
of the current anxiety concerning immigration results from the
high levels of unauthorized migration, and how much is simply a
reaction to large-scale immigration in general, with "illegal"
status serving as a convenient outlet for a more general frustration. But policies that reduce illegal immigration are likely to
help shape American attitudes concerning immigration to correspond with our national mythology as a country that welcomes
immigrants and thrives because of their presence. The cycle in
which the United States finds itself--of permitting an undocumented population to accumulate as the result of underenforcement and the failure to update the legal immigration system to changing demographic pressures, followed by immigration
reform that includes legalization of undocumented migrants-is
unhealthy, if only because it erodes support for the immigration
that is both an inevitable and necessary part of the country's future.
But as a means of breaking this unproductive cycle, a guest
worker program promises short-term benefits and long-term friction. Because temporary worker programs are being proposed to
channel migration flows with semi-permanent to permanent time
horizons, they should be adopted only to the extent that they are
consistent with the long-term objectives of assimilation. But by
limiting immigrant mobility and failing to encourage reciprocity
on the part of Americans, guest worker programs fall short of
that objective. Our long-term interest in assimilation would be
far better served by substantially expanding opportunities for
permanent membership, perhaps by expanding the number of
LPR visas available to unskilled immigrants and raising the
country ceilings on immigration from key parts of the world,
namely Mexico. Of course, given the current political climate, a
guest worker program may be a second-best solution: we might
not have sufficient political will or administrative capacity to
support these greater reforms, and a guest worker program is
certainly preferable to the persistence of undocumented immigration. That said, though our nation's history of adapting to
immigration has unfolded in a decidedly mixed way, in the end, a
guest worker program is not worthy of the principles of opportunity, equality, and mutual respect among members that characterize the aspect of American immigration history we should
strive to perpetuate.

